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Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

Metaphysics and Philosophy of Gottfried Leibniz (1646 - 1716). Explaining Leibniz's Monadology / Monad with the Wave Structure of Matter (matter and the universe are one interconnected whole).

Gottfried Leibniz Pictures - Biography - Quotes 'Philosophical Investigations'

Reality cannot be found except in One single source, because of the interconnection of all things with one another. ... I do not conceive of any reality at all as without genuine unity. ... I maintain also that substances, whether material or immaterial, cannot be conceived in their bare essence without any activity, activity being of the essence of substance in general.
(Gottfried Leibniz, 1670)


Introduction - Gottfried Leibniz Monadology, Monad - Leibniz Metaphysics - Leibniz Quotes - Links / Leibniz Philosophy - Top of Page

Leibniz Monadology Monad - On the Interconnection of All Things Introduction to Metaphysics / Philosophy of Leibniz

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz lived from 1646 - 1716 (thirteen years after the birth of Spinoza and four years before the death of Descartes). He studied geometry under the guidance of Christiaan Huygens and in 1676 Leibniz completed his discovery of Differential Calculus (independently of Sir Isaac Newton). Prior to this discovery of Calculus, Gottfried Leibniz wrote extensively on a number of subjects such as logic, truth, reason, philosophy and metaphysics which culminated in his Monadology (Philosophical Investigations, 1670).
Leibniz was a fine philosopher, and the following quotes are still very relevant and important to philosophy, physics and metaphysics;

I hold that the mark of a genuine idea is that its possibility can be proved, either a priori by conceiving its cause or reason, or a posteriori when experience teaches us that it is in fact in nature. ... It is a good thing to proceed in order and to establish propositions. This is the way to gain ground and to progress with certainty. (Gottfried Leibniz, 1670)

Monas is a Greek word which signifies unity or that which is one. As Leibniz writes;

I do not conceive of any reality at all as without genuine unity. (Gottfried Leibniz, 1670)

Leibniz described Reality (the One thing which exists and connects the many things) as One Substance (which is active) and God;

.. the ultimate reason of things must lie in a necessary substance, in which the differentiation of the changes only exists eminently as in their source; and this is what we call God. .. God alone is the primary Unity, or original simple substance, from which all monads, created and derived, are produced. (Leibniz, 1670)
I maintain also that substances, whether material or immaterial, cannot be conceived in their bare essence without any activity, activity being of the essence of substance in general. (Gottfried Leibniz, 1670)

Gottfried Leibniz's Monadology is largely correct, matter and universe are One. But we can now better understand his Monad as a Spherical Wave Motion of Space that determines the size of our finite spherical 'observable' universe within infinite Space, and thus interacts with ALL other matter within our universe.

It follows from what we have just said, that the natural changes of monads come from an internal principle, and that change is continual in each one. … Now this connection of all created things with each, and of each with all the rest, means that each simple substance has relations which express all the others, each created monad represents the whole universe. (Leibniz, 1670)

If you read the simple deduction of the Metaphysics of Space and Motion and the Wave Structure of Matter then you can see how close Leibniz was to understanding the truth about physical reality. Leibniz was a fine philosopher, we hope you enjoy the reading the following quotes (and they make a lot of sense if you have the spherical standing wave structure of matter in mind as you read them!).

Geoff Haselhurst

Indeed in general I hold that there is nothing truer than happiness, and nothing happier and sweeter than truth. (Leibniz, 1670)


Introduction - Gottfried Leibniz Monadology, Monad - Leibniz Metaphysics - Leibniz Quotes - Links / Leibniz Philosophy - Top of Page

Leibniz Monadology Monad - On the Interconnection of All Things Leibniz’s Monadology, Monad

Monas is a Greek word which signifies unity or that which is one. As Leibniz writes;

I do not conceive of any reality at all as without genuine unity. (Gottfried Leibniz, 1670)

In his Monadology Leibniz describes Reality (the One thing which exists and connects the many things) as One Substance (which is active) and God;

.. the ultimate reason of things must lie in a necessary substance, in which the differentiation of the changes only exists eminently as in their source; and this is what we call God. .. God alone is the primary Unity, or original simple substance, from which all monads, created and derived, are produced. (Leibniz, 1670)
I maintain also that substances, whether material or immaterial, cannot be conceived in their bare essence without any activity, activity being of the essence of substance in general. (Gottfried Leibniz, 1670)

Gottfried Leibniz's Monadology is largely correct, matter and universe are One. But we can now better understand his Monad as a Spherical Wave Motion of Space that determines the size of our finite spherical universe within an infinite Space, and thus interacts with ALL other matter within our universe.

It follows from what we have just said, that the natural changes of monads come from an internal principle, and that change is continual in each one. … Now this connection of all created things with each, and of each with all the rest, means that each simple substance has relations which express all the others, each created monad represents the whole universe. (Leibniz, 1670)

Now this connection or adaption of all created things with each, and of each with all the rest, means that each simple substance has relations which express all the others, and that consequently it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe. (Leibniz, 1670)

1. The monad, of which we shall speak here, is nothing but a simple substance which enters into compounds; simple, that is to say, without parts.
2. And there must be simple substances, because there are compounds; for the compound is nothing but a collection or aggregatum of simples.
3. Now where there are no parts, there neither extension, nor shape, nor divisibility is possible. And these monads are the true atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things.
5. There is no way in which a simple substance could begin in the course of nature, since it cannot be formed by means of compounding.

9. Indeed every monad must be different from every other. For there are never in nature two beings, which are precisely alike, and in which it is not possible to find some difference which is internal, or based on some intrinsic quality.
10. I also take it as granted that every created thing, and consequently the created monad also, is subject to change, and indeed that this change is continual in each one.
11. It follows from what we have just said, that the natural changes of monads come from an internal principle, since an external cause would be unable to influence their inner being. (Leibniz, 1670)

22. And as every state of a simple substance is a natural consequence of its preceding state, so that the present state of it is big with the future (Leibniz, 1670)

Gottfried Leibniz, Philosophical Investigations, 1670


Introduction - Gottfried Leibniz Monadology, Monad - Leibniz Metaphysics - Leibniz Quotes - Links / Leibniz Philosophy - Top of Page

Leibniz Monadology Monad - On the Interconnection of All Things Metaphysics of Gottfried Leibniz

For thousands of years philosophers have gazed at the stars and known that One thing must exist that is common to and connects the Many things within the Universe. As Leibniz profoundly says;

Reality cannot be found except in One single source, because of the interconnection of all things with one another. (Leibniz, 1670)

Thus as matter interacts with all other matter in the universe, to ask 'What is matter?' is no different than asking, 'What is the universe?', or more completely 'What exists, what is Reality?'. The solution is found in One Principle which describes the One Substance which exists (Space) and its Properties (Wave-Medium) such that we can then explain the necessary connection between the many things which exist. From this One Principle we can deduce the following Properties of Space and General Laws.

All Truth ultimately comes from Reality. Thus the past errors and ultimate failure to correctly describe Reality (which is now believed to be impossible) have left modern Metaphysics and Truth with an understandably bad reputation. With help from Aristotle and Leibniz, we can now correct these errors in the following simple way. As Aristotle confirms;

The first philosophy (Metaphysics) is universal and is exclusively concerned with primary substance. & It is the principles and causes of the things that are that we are seeking, and clearly it is their principles and causes just as things that are. & And here we will have the science to study that which is just as that which is, both in its essence and in the properties which, just as a thing that is, it has. (Aristotle, 340BC)

Thus at the heart of Metaphysics is Substance and its Properties, which exists and causes all things, and is therefore the necessary foundation for all human knowledge. Most importantly, Aristotle and Leibniz were correct to realize that One Substance must have Properties that account for matter's interconnection and Motion.

The entire preoccupation of the physicist is with things that contain within themselves a principle of movement and rest. And to seek for this is to seek for the second kind of principle, that from which comes the beginning of the change. & There must then be a principle of such a kind that its substance is activity. (Aristotle, 340BC)
I maintain also that substances, whether material or immaterial, cannot be conceived in their bare essence without any activity, activity being of the essence of substance in general. (Leibniz, 1670)

The solution is to realize that Space exists as a wave-medium and contains spherical wave-motions that cause matter and its interconnected activity/change. Thus Leibniz's error was to think Space is what exists between matter (as a property of 'things'), rather than matter existing as a spherical standing wave in space. As writes Albert Einstein;

(Describing motion relative to all other matter in the universe) overcomes a deficiency in the foundations of mechanics which had already been noticed by Newton and was criticised by Leibniz and, two centuries later, by Mach: inertia resists acceleration, but acceleration relative to what? Within the frame of classical mechanics the only answer is: inertia resists acceleration relative to space. This is a physical property of space - space acts on objects, but objects do not act on space. Such is probably the deeper meaning of Newton's assertion spatium est absolutum (space is absolute). But the idea disturbed some, in particular Leibniz, who did not ascribe an independent existence to space but considered it merely a property of 'things' (objects). (Albert Einstein, 1954)


Introduction - Gottfried Leibniz Monadology, Monad - Leibniz Metaphysics - Leibniz Quotes - Links / Leibniz Philosophy - Top of Page

Leibniz Monadology Monad - On the Interconnection of All Things Quotations from Philosophical Investigations by Gottfried Leibniz

I hold that the mark of a genuine idea is that its possibility can be proved, either a priori by conceiving its cause or reason, or a posteriori when experience teaches us that it is in fact in nature. (Leibniz, 1670)

Indeed in general I hold that there is nothing truer than happiness, and nothing happier and sweeter than truth. (Leibniz, 1670)

I agree with you that it is important to examine our presuppositions, thoroughly and once for all, in order to establish something solid. For I hold that it is only when we can prove all that we bring forward that we perfectly understand the thing under consideration. I know that the common herd takes little pleasure in these researches, but I know also that the common herd take little pains thoroughly to understand things. (Leibniz, 1670)

It is a good thing to proceed in order and to establish propositions. This is the way to gain ground and to progress with certainty. (Leibniz, 1670)

... a distinction must be made between true and false ideas, and that too much rein must not be given to a man's imagination under pretext of its being a clear and distinct intellection. (Leibniz, 1670)

But it is the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths which distinguishes us from mere animals, and gives us reason and the sciences, raising us to knowledge of ourselves and God. It is this in us which we call the rational soul or mind. (Leibniz, 1670)

When a truth is necessary, the reason for it can be found by analysis, that is, by resolving it into simpler ideas and truths until the primary ones are reached. It is this way that in mathematics speculative theorems and practical canons are reduced by analysis to definitions, axioms and postulates. (Leibniz, 1670)

..This is why the ultimate reason of things must lie in a necessary substance, in which the differentiation of the changes only exists eminently as in their source; and this is what we call God. (Leibniz, 1670)

Thus God alone is the primary Unity, or original simple substance, from which all monads, created and derived, are produced. (Leibniz, 1670)

Now this connection or adaption of all created things with each, and of each with all the rest, means that each simple substance has relations which express all the others, and that consequently it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe. (Leibniz, 1670)

Leibniz agrees with Kant in conceding to Locke that all knowledge must start with sense-experience, and also in denying that it can be wholly derived from sense-experience. He goes further and makes the pregnant suggestion, nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, excipe, nisi ipse intellectus- there is nothing in the understanding which was not previously in the senses, except the understanding itself. (Introduction to Philosophical Investigations, p28)

Leibniz further shows the way to Kant by emphasising the distinction between truths of reason on the one hand, which are a priori, in the sphere of necessity, and concerned with general notions of possibilities, and on the other, truths of fact, which are a posteriori, in the sphere of contingency, and concerned with individuals or real existences. (Introduction to Philosophical Investigations, p28)

1. The monad, of which we shall speak here, is nothing but a simple substance which enters into compounds; simple, that is to say, without parts. (Leibniz, p3)

2. And there must be simple substances, because there are compounds; for the compound is nothing but a collection or aggregatum of simples. (Leibniz, p3)

3. Now where there are no parts, there neither extension, nor shape, nor divisibility is possible. And these monads are the true atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things. (Leibniz, p3)

5. There is no way in which a simple substance could begin in the course of nature, since it cannot be formed by means of compounding. (Leibniz, p3)

9. Indeed every monad must be different from every other. For there are never in nature two beings, which are precisely alike, and in which it is not possible to find some difference which is internal, or based on some intrinsic quality.(Leibniz, p4)

10. I also take it as granted that every created thing, and consequently the created monad also, is subject to change, and indeed that this change is continual in each one. (Leibniz, p4)

11. It follows from what we have just said, that the natural changes of monads come from an internal principle, since an external cause would be unable to influence their inner being. (Leibniz, p4)

22. And as every state of a simple substance is a natural consequence of its preceding state, so that the present state of it is big with the future (Leibniz, p7)

28. Men act like brutes in so far as the sequences of their perceptions arise through the principle of memory only, like those empirical physicians who have mere practice without theory. We are all merely empiricists as regards three-fourths of our actions. For example, when we expect it to be day tomorrow, we are behaving as empiricists, because until now it has always happened thus. The astronomer alone knows this by reason. (Leibniz, p8)

31. Our reasonings are based on two great principles: the principle of contradiction, by virtue of which we judge to be false that which involves a contradiction, and true that which is opposed or contradictory to the false;
32. and the principle of sufficient reason, by virtue of which we consider that no fact can be real or existing and no proposition can be true unless there is a sufficient reason, why it should be thus and not otherwise, even though in most cases these reasons cannot be known to us. (Leibniz, p8-9)

33. There are also two kinds of truths: truth of reasoning and truths of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible; those of fact are contingent and their opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, the reason for it can be found by analysis, that is, by resolving it into simpler ideas and truths until the primary ones are reached. (Leibniz, p9)

34. It is this way that in mathematics speculative theorems and practical canons are reduced by analysis to definitions, axioms and postulates. (Leibniz, p9)
35. Finally there are simple ideas of which no definition can be given; there are also axioms or postulates, or in a word primary principles, which cannot be proved and have no need of proof. (Leibniz, p9)

38. This is why the ultimate reason of things must lie in a necessary substance, in which the differentiation of the changes only exists eminently as in their source; and this is what we call God. (Leibniz, p10)

41. Whence it follows that God is absolutely perfect, since perfection is nothing but magnitude of positive reality, in the strict sense, setting aside the limits or bounds in things which are limited. And there, where there are no bounds, that is to say in God, perfection is absolutely infinite.(Leibniz, p10)

47. Thus God alone is the primary Unity, or original simple substance, from which all monads, created and derived, are produced (Leibniz, p11)

51. But in simple substances the influence of one monad over another is ideal only; it can have its effect only through the intervention of God, inasmuch as in the ideas of God a monad rightly demands that God, in regulating the rest from the beginning of things, should have regard to itself. For since it is impossible for a created monad to have a physical influence on the inner nature of another, this is the only way in which one can be dependent on another. (Leibniz, p12)

56. Now this connection or adaption of all created things with each, and of each with all the rest, means that each simple substance has relations which express all the others, and that consequently it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe.
(p12-3 L)

60... In a confused way they all go towards the infinite, or towards the whole; but they are limited and distinguished from one another by the degrees of their distinct perceptions. (p14 L)
61... For as the whole is a plenum, which means that the whole of matter is connected, and as in a plenum every movement has some effect on distant bodies in proportion to their distance, so that each body not only is affected by those which touch it, and is in some way sensitive to whatever happens to them, but also by means of them is sensitive to those to those which touch the first bodies by which it is itself directly touched; it follows that this communication stretches out indefinitely. Consequently every body is sensitive to everything which is happening in the universe, so much so that one who saw everything could read in each body what is happening everywhere, and even what has happened or what will happen, by observing in the present the things that are distant in time as well as space. (p14 L)
62. Thus although each created monad represents the whole universe, it represents more distinctly the body which is particularly affected by it (p14 L)
68. And although the earth and the air interspersed between the plants in the garden, or the water interspersed between the fish in the pond, are neither plant nor fish, yet they still contain them, though most usually of a subtlety which renders them imperceptible to us. (p15 L)

Monas is a Greek word which signifies unity or that which is one. (p21 L)

For the simplicity of substance does not preclude the possibility of a multiplicity of modifications, which indeed necessarily exist together in the same simple substance, and these modifications must consist in the variety of the relations of the simple substance to things that are outside. Just as in a centre or a point, in itself perfectly simple, are found an infinite number of angles formed by the lines which meet there. (p21 L)

3. All nature is a plenum. Everywhere there are simple substances, effectively separated from one another by actions of their own which are continually altering their relations; and each simple substance or distinct monad, which forms the centre of a compound substance (eg. of an animal) and the principle of its oneness, is surrounded by a mass composed of an infinite number of other monads which constitute the body belonging to this central monad; corresponding to the affections of its body it represents, as in a kind of centre, the things that are outside of it. And this body is organic, when it forms a kind of automaton or natural machine, which is a machine not only as a whole but also in its smallest observable parts. And since the world is a plenum everything is connected together, and each body acts on every other body more or less according to the distance, and is affected by it by reaction, it follows that every monad is a mirror that is alive or endowed with inner activity, is representative of the universe from its own point of view, and is as much regulated as the universe itself. The perceptions in the monad spring from one another according to the laws of the or the final causes of good and evil, which consist in the observable perceptions, regulated or unregulated- in the same way as the changes of the bodies and the phenomena outside spring from one another according to the laws of efficient causes, that is to say of motions. Thus there is a perfect harmony between the perceptions of the monad and the motions of the bodies, pre-established at the outset between the system of efficient causes and the system of final causes. Herein consists the concord and the physical union of the soul and the body, which exists without the one being able to change the laws of the other. (p22 L)

There is a connection between the perceptions of animals, which bears some resemblance to reason: but it is based only on the memory of facts or effects, and not at all on the knowledge of causes. Thus a dog runs away from the stick with which he has been beaten, because memory represents to him the pain that was caused by that stick. And men, in so far as they are empiricists, that is to say in three-fourths of their actions, only act like brutes. For example, we expect that the day will dawn tomorrow, because we have always experienced it to be so; it is only the astronomer who foresees it by reason, and even this prediction will ultimately fail when the cause of daylight, which is not eternal, ceases. But true reasoning depends on necessary or eternal truths (like the truths of logic, numbers and geometry) which make the connection of ideas indubitable, and the sequences inevitable. Animals in which such sequences cannot be observed are called brutes; but those which know these necessary truths are called rational animals, and their souls are called minds. These souls are capable of performing acts of reflection, and of considering what is called self, substance, soul, mind- those things and truths, in short, which are immaterial. It is this which makes us capable of understanding science or demonstrative knowledge. (p24 L)

Thus the sufficient reason, which needs no further reason, must be outside this series of contingent things, and must lie in a substance which is the cause of this series, or which is a being that bears the reason of its existence within itself; otherwise we should still not have a sufficient reason, with which we could stop. And this final reason is called God. (p26 L)

It is the same with each monad. God alone has a distinct knowledge of everything, for He is the source of everything. It has been very well said that as a centre He is everywhere; but His circumference is nowhere, since everything is present to Him immediately, without being removed from this centre. (p28 L)

For the dominant Unity of the universe not only rules the world, but also constructs or makes it; and it is higher than the world and, if I may so put it, extramundane; it is thus the ultimate reason of things. (p32 L)

Indifference arise from ignorance, and the wiser the man is, the more is he determined to that action which is most perfect. (p36 L)

For since in the series a reason cannot be found, as I have shown above, but must be sought in metaphysical necessities or eternal truths; since, too, existent things cannot come into being except from existent things, as I have explained previously; it follows that eternal truths must have their existence in some subject which is absolutely or metaphysically necessary, that is in God, through whom these truths, which would otherwise be imaginary, are (to use a barbarous but expressive word ) realised. (p36 L)

And indeed in actual fact we find that everything in the world takes place in accordance with the laws of the eternal truths, not only geometrical but also metaphysical laws; that is, not only according to material necessities, but also according to formal necessities. (p36-7 L)

It cannot be found except in one single source, because of the interconnection of all these things with one another. (p37 L)

On the same principle it has an insipid effect if we always eat sweet things; sharp, acid, and even bitter things should be mixed in to stimulate the taste. He who has not tasted what is bitter has not earned what is sweet, not will he appreciate it. This is the very law of enjoyment, that positive pleasure does not come from an even course; such things produce weariness, and make men dull not joyful. (p39-40 L)

Indeed in general I hold that there is nothing truer than happiness, and nothing happier and sweeter than truth. (p41 L)

I agree with you that it is important to examine our presuppositions, thoroughly and once for all, in order to establish something solid. For I hold that it is only when we can prove all that we bring forward that we perfectly understand the thing under consideration. I know that the common herd takes little pleasure in these researches, but I know also that the common herd take little pains thoroughly to understand things. (p45 L)

Now this possibility or necessity forms or composes what are called essences or natures, and the truths which we are accustomed to call eternal; and we are right so to call them, for nothing is so eternal as what is necessary. Thus the nature of the circle with its properties is something which exists and is eternal: that is to say there is some constant cause outside us which makes all those who think about it carefully discover the same thing, and not merely that their thoughts disagree with one another; this might be attributed simply to the nature of the human mind, but for the fact that phenomena or experiences confirm them whenever some appearance of a circle strikes our senses. And these phenomena necessarily have some cause outside us. (p46 L)

But though the existence of necessities comes first of all in itself and in the order of nature, I agree none the less that it is not the first in the order of our knowledge. For you see that in order to prove its existence I have taken for granted that we think and that we have sensations. Here then are two absolute general truths, truths that is to say which treat of the actual existence of things: the one that we think, the other that there is a great variety in our thoughts. From the first it follows that we are, from the other it follows that there is something other than us; something other, that is to say, than that which thinks, which is the cause of the variety of our appearances. (p46-7 L)
But the greatest genius of the world is unable to force matters, and we must of necessity enter by the gates provided by nature if we are not to go astray. Moreover, one man alone cannot do everything at the outset; and for my part when I consider all the fine things M. Descartes has said, and said by himself, I marvel rather at what he has done than that there is something he has failed to do. (p47 L)

It is true I have often glanced at Galileo and Descartes, but as I have only recently become a geometrician, I was soon put off by their manner of writing, which necessitated serious thought. And personally, although I have always taken pleasure in meditations of my own, I have always found it difficult to read books which cannot be understood without much thought; for in following one's own meditations one follows a certain natural bent, and gains profit and pleasure at the same time, whereas one is terribly put out at having to follow the meditations of another. (p47 L)

I always liked books which, while containing some fine thoughts, could be read straight through without stopping, for they gave rise in me to ideas which I followed at fancy, and pursued as the spirit moved me. (p47-8 L)

I have learnt from experience that this method in general a good one, but I have also learnt none the less that an exception must be made in the case of some authors, such as PLato and Aristotle among the ancient philosophers, and Galileo and M. Descartes among those of our day. (p48 L)

For at bottom, all our experiences assure us of two things only, namely that there is a connection in our appearances which gives us a means of successfully predicting future appearances; and secondly that this connection must have a constant cause. But from all this it does not strictly follow that there is matter or that there are bodies, but only that there is something which presents us with appearances which follow properly on one another. (p49 L)

It is true the more we see a connection in what happens to us, the more we are confined in the opinion that there is reality in our appearances; and it is true also that the more nearly we examine appearances, the better connected we find them to be, as microscopes and other ways of making experiments show us. This perpetual agreement gives us great assurance; but after all it will be no more than a moral assurance until somebody discovers a priori the origin of the world which we see, and probes in the depths of its essence to find the reason why things are as they seem. When that is done, it will be proved that what appears to us is a reality, and that it is impossible that we should ever be disabused about it. (p50 L)

..it is a good thing to proceed in order and to establish propositions. This is the way to gain ground and to progress with certainty. (p51 L)
9. That each single substance expresses the whole universe in its own way, and that in its notion are included all the events which will happen to it with all their circumstances, and the whole series of things outside it. (p53 L)

17. An example of a subordinate maxim of the law of nature, in which it is shown that God always regularly conserves the same force, but not the same quantity of motion, contrary to the teaching of the Cartesians and some others. (p55 L)

In fact the wiser the man is, the less does he have detached acts of will, and the more do his views and his acts of will become comprehensive and connected. (p60 L)

..Every man who acts wisely considers all the circumstances and connections of the decision he is taking, and the more so in proportion to his capacity. (p61 L)

That is why in the case of individual considerations, or considerations of practice, quae versantur circa singularia*, besides the form of the sphere there enter in the matter of which it is made, the place, the time, and the other circumstances, which by a continual chain would in the end cover the whole series of the universe, if it were possible to follow out all that these notions include. (p63 L)
* 'which are concerned with individuals', what is individual being opposed to what is general.

...As regards the objection that possibles are independent of the decisions of God, I grant that they are so actual decisions (though the Cartesians do not agree with this); but I hold that possible individual notions include a number of possible free decisions. (p63 L)

For everything must be explained by its cause; and the cause of the universe is the ends of God. Now each individual substance, according to my view, expresses the whole universe from a certain point of view. (p64 L)

I hold that the mark of a genuine idea is that its possibility can be proved, either a priori by conceiving its cause or reason, or a posteriori when experience teaches us that it is in fact in nature. (p74-5 L)

...a distinction must be made between true and false ideas, and that too much rein must not be given to a man's imagination under pretext of its being a clear and distinct intellection. (p75 L)

We must then come down to either the mathematical points, out of which some authors compound extension, or to the atoms of Epicurus and M. Cordemoy (which are things that you and I alike reject ), or else we must acknowledge that no reality can be found in bodies; or finally we must recognise some substances as having genuine unity. (p78 L)

You say you do not see what leads me to admit that there are such substantial terms, or rather corporeal substances, endowed with a genuine unity. It is because I do not conceive of any reality at all as without genuine unity. (p80 L)

We may say then of these composites and of similar things what Democritus so well said of them, namely, esse opinione, lege vo..*
* 'they depend for their existence on opinion or custom' (p81 L)

If on the other hand we prefer the unity based on contact, we are faced with other difficulties. Hard bodies have perhaps nothing uniting their parts except the pressure of surrounding bodies and of themselves, and in their substance are no more united than a heap of sand, arena sine calce*
* ' sand without lime' , i.e. without anything to bind it into mortar. (p82 L)

..so long as we do not distinguish what is genuinely a complete entity, or substance, we shall never have any fixed point at which we can stop; and such fixed point is the one and only means of establishing solid and real principles.
In conclusion, nothing should be taken as certain without foundations; it is therefore those who manufacture entities and substances without genuine unity to prove that there is more to reality than I have just said; and I am waiting for the notion of a substance, or of an entity, which successfully comprehends all these things; after which parts and perhaps even dreams will be able one day to lay claim to reality ... (p83 L)

In natural perception and in sensation it is sufficient that what is divisible and material, and is to be found dispersed in a number of entities, should be expressed or represented in a single indivisible entity, or in a substance possessing a genuine unity. (p84 L)

Thus our body must be affected to some extent by the changes in all the others. (p85 L)

It must be the case that I have some perception of the movement of each wave on the shore if I am able to apperceive that which results from the movements of all the waves put together, namely the mighty roar which we hear by the sea. (p85 L)

With regard to minds, that is to say substances which think, and are capable of knowing God and of discovering eternal truths, I hold that God governs them by laws different from those by which He governs the rest of substances. (p86 L)

The fact is, I think, that my objection is so simple that its very simplicity operated to deceive him, since he could not believe that a comment which was so easy could have escaped the notice of so many able people. (p90 L)

.. I\ shall always be very happy to receive, provided the love of truth appears therein, and not merely a passion for preconceived opinions. Although I am one of those who have done much work on mathematics, I have constantly meditated on philosophy from my youth up, for it has always seemed to me that in philosophy there was a way of establishing something solid by means of clear proofs. (p97-8 L)

.. when I tried to get to the bottom of the actual principles of mechanics in order to give an explanation of the laws of Nature which are known through experience, I became aware that the consideration of an extended mass is not of itself enough, and that use must also be made of the notion of force, (p98 L)

At first, when I had freed myself from the yoke of Aristotle, I had believed in the void and atoms, for it is this which best satisfies the imagination. But returning to this view after much meditation, I perceived that it is impossible to find the principles of a true unity in matter alone, or in what is merely passive, since everything in it is but a collection or accumulation of parts ad infinitum. Now a multiplicity can be real only if it is made up of true unities which come from elsewhere and are altogether different from mathematical points, which are nothing but extremities of the extended and modifications out of which it is certain that nothing continuous could be compounded. Therefore, to find these real unities, I was constrained to have recourse to what might be called a real and animated point or to an atom of substance which must embrace some element of form or of activity in order to make a complete being. (p98-9 L)

But atoms of matter are contrary to reason, besides the fact that they also are composed of parts, since the invincible attachment of one part of another (granted that this could be reasonably conceived or supposed) would not destroy their diversity. It is only atoms of substance, that is to say unities which are real and absolutely without parts, which can be the sources of actions, and the absolute first principles of the composition of things, and as it were the ultimate elements into which substantial things, and as it were the ultimate elements into which substantial things can be analysed. They might be called metaphysical points; there is about them something vital and a kind of perception, and mathematical points are their points of view for expressing the universe. (p103 L)

Since each mind is as it were a world apart, sufficient unto itself, independent of all other created things, including the infinite, expressing the universe, it is as lasting, as subsistent, and as absolute as the very universe of created things itself. We must therefore conclude that it must always play its part in the way most suited to contribute to the perfection of that society of all minds which constitutes their moral union in the City of God. Here, too, is a new and wonderfully clear proof of all the existence of God. For this perfect agreement of all these substances, which have no point of communication with one another, could only come from the one common cause. (p107 L)

It is true that we can easily conceive of matter both as giving out and as taking parts; and it is in this way that we rightly explain in terms of mechanics all the phenomena of physics (p108 L)

It was my aim here to expound, not the principles of extension, but the principles of that which is in fact extended, or of bodily mass. These principles, according to me, are the real units, that is to say the substances that possess a true unity. (p109 L)

Imagine two clocks or watches which are in perfect agreement. Now this agreement may come about in three ways. The first consists of a natural influence. This is what M. Huygens tried with a result that surprised him. He suspended two pendulums from the same piece of wood; the continual strokes of the pendulums communicated similar vibrations to the particles of the wood; but since these different vibrations could not well persist independently and without interfering with one another, unless the pendulums were in agreement, it happened by some sort of miracle that even when their strokes had been purposely disturbed, they soon went back to swinging together, rather like two strings* which are in unison.
* i.e. strings of a musical instrument (p115 L)

However, I do not consider the hardness or consistency of bodies as a primary quality, but as a consequence of motion. (p118 L)

Leibniz and Locke
It is true that I am often of another opinion from him, but, far from denying the merit of famous writers, we bear witness to it by showing wherin and wherefore we differ from them, since we deem it necessary to prevent their authority from prevailing against reason in certain important points; besides the fact that, in convincing such excellent men, we make the truth more acceptable, and it is to be supposed that it is chiefly for truth's sake that they are labouring. (p142)
The senses, although they are necessary for all our actual knowledge, are not sufficient to give us the whole of it, since the senses never give anything but instances, that is to say particular or individual truths. Now all the instances which confirm a general truth, however numerous they may be, are not sufficient to establish the universal necessity of this same truth, for it does not follow what happened before will happen the same way again. (p144 L)

The success of experiments serves also as a confirmation of reason, more or less as verifications serve in arithmetic to help us avoid erroneous calculation when the reasoning is long. It is in this also that the knowledge of men differs from that of the brutes: the latter are purely empirical, and guide themselves solely by particular instances; for, as far as we can judge, they never go so far as to form necessary propositions; whereas men are capable of the demonstrative sciences. This also is why the faculty the brutes have of making sequences of ideas is something inferior to the reason which is in man. The sequences of the brutes are just like those of the simple empiricists who claim that what has happened sometimes will happen again in a case where what strikes them is similar, without being capable of determining whether the same reasons hold good. It is because of this that it is so easy for men to catch animals, and so easy for pure empiricists to make mistakes. (p145 L)

For reason alone is capable of setting up rules which are certain, and of supplying what is lacking to those which are not certain, by inserting the exceptions, and in short of finding connections which are certain in the force of necessary consequences. This often provides the means of foreseeing the event, without its being necessary to experience the sensible connections between images which is all that the brutes can do; so that to vindicate the existence within us of the principles of necessary truths is also to distinguish man from the brutes. (p146 L)

..ideas whose origin is not in sensation arise from reflection. Now reflection is nothing but an attention to what is in us, and the senses do not give us what we already bring with us. This being so, can we deny that there is a great deal that is innate in our mind, (p146 L)

It is thus that habituation causes us not to notice the motion of a mill or waterfall, after we have lived near by for some time. It is not that the motion does not continue to affect our organs, and that something does not still take place in the soul to correspond to it, on account of the harmony of the soul and the body; it is that these impressions which are in the soul and in the body, when they are devoid of the attractions of novelty, are not strong enough to attract our attention and memory, when these are attached to more absorbing objects. (p149 L)

It may be even be said that as a result of these minute perceptions the present is big with the future and laden with the past, that everything is in league together, and that in the smallest substance eyes as piercing as those of God could read the whole sequence of things in the universe:
Quae sint, quae fuerint, quae mox futura trahantur
[the things that are, the things that have been, and those that are presently to come.](p150 L)

..observable perceptions come by degrees from those which are too small to be observed (p152)

This means that it has throughout a degree of rigidity as well as of fluidity, and that there does not exist any body which is absolutely hard or absolutely fluid; that is to say that it is impossible to find in any body any atom whose hardness is indefeasible (p156 L)

It is true, I say, " that bodies operate by impulse, and nothing else ". And so I thought when I writ it, and can yet conceive no other way of their operation. But I am since convinced by the judicious Mr Newton's incomparable book, that it is too bold a presumption to limit God's power, in this point, by my narrow conceptions. The gravitation of matter towards matter, by ways inconceivable to me, is not only a demonstration that God can, if he pleases, put into bodies powers and ways of operation, above what can be derived from our idea of body or can be explained by what we know of matter .. (p157 L)

It is evident, at least as far as we can conceive it, that bodies act upon one another by impulse and not otherwise; for it is impossible for us to understand that a body can act upon that which it does not touch, which is as much as to imagine that it can act where it is not. (p158 L)

The question he is discussing with the celebrated prelate, who has attacked him, is whether matter can think, and as this is an important point, even for the present work, I cannot avoid going into the subject a little and taking some account of their dispute. (p159 L)

I maintain also that substances, whether material or immaterial, cannot be conceived in their bare essence without any activity, activity being of the essence of substance in general ... (p163 L)

For it is incontestable that the senses are not sufficient to make us see their necessity, and so the mind has the dispositions (as much active as passive) to draw them itself out of its own depths; though the senses are necessary to give to it the occasion and the attention required for this, and to lead it rather to the one sort than to the other. (p170 L)

The original proof of necessary truths comes from the understanding alone, and all other truths come from experiences or from observations of the senses. Our mind is capable of knowing both the one sort and the other, but it is the source of the first; whatever number of particular experiences we may have of a universal truth, we cannot assure ourselves of it for always by induction, without apprehending its necessity by reason. (p170 L)

They are either truths of reason or truths of fact. Truths of reason are necessary, those of fact are contingent. (p182 L)

As regards the proposition that three is equal to two and one, which you adduce, Sir, as an example of intuitive knowledge, my comment is that it is simply the definition of the term three; for the simplest definitions of numbers are formed in this manner- two is one and one, three is two and one, four is three and one, and so on. (p185 L)

It is true that a man of judgement, that is to say, one who is capable of attention and restraint, and who has the necessary leisure and patience and is open-minded enough, can understand the most difficult demonstration if it is properly put to him. (p187 L)

Often beautiful truths are arrived at by Synthesis, by passing from the simple to the compound. (p187 L)

..thus there will be two sorts of knowledge as there are two sorts of proofs, of which the one produces certainty, while the other arrives at probability only. (p189 L)

..the connection of phenomena, which guarantees truths of fact with regard to sensible things outside us, is verified by means of truths of reason (p191 L)

Mr Newton says that space is the organ which God makes use of to perceive things by. (p192 L)

It is said expressively in the Appendix to Mr Newton's Optics that space is God's sensorium. Now the word sensorium has always meant the organ of sensation. Let him and his friends now give a quite different explanation of their meaning: I shall not object. (p195 L) (2nd letter)

Something quite other than mere presence is needed for one thing to represent what takes place in another. For this some explicable communication is necessary, some kind of influence either of the things upon one another or of a common cause. (p195 L)

3. These gentlemen maintain, then, that space is a real absolute being; but this leads them into great difficulties. For it appears that this being must be eternal and infinite. This is why there have been some who believed that it was God Himself, or else His attribute, His immensity. But as it has parts, it is not a thing which can be appropriate to God.
4. As for me, I have more than once stated that I held space to be something purely relative, like time; space being an order of co-existences as time is an order of successions. For space denotes in terms of possibility an order of things which exist at the same time, in so far as they exist together, and is not concerned with their particular ways of existing: and when we see several things together we perceive this order of things among themselves.
5. I have several proofs for refuting the conception of those who take space to be a substance, or at least as absolute being of some kind. But here I only wish to make use of the one which the present occasion requires. I say then that if space were an absolute being, there would happen something for which it would be impossible that there should be a sufficient reason, and this is contrary to our axiom. (p199 L)

The supernatural surpasses all the powers of created things. We must take an example. Here is one which I have often made use of with success. If God wished to cause a free body to circle in the ether round about a given fixed center, without any other created thing acting on it, this, I say, could only occur by miracle, not being explicable by the nature of bodies. For a free body naturally departs from a curve along the tangent. It is in this sense that I maintain that the attraction of bodies, properly so called, is a miraculous thing, since it cannot be explained by their nature. (p203 L)

10. If space is an absolute reality, far from being a property or accident opposed to substance, it will have more subsistence than substance; God will be unable to destroy it, or even to change it in any respect. It will be not only immense in the whole, but also immutable and eternal in each of its parts. There will be an infinity of eternal things besides God. (p205 L)

16. If space and time were something absolute, that is to say if they were something other than certain orders of things, what I am saying would be a contradiction. But since this is not the case, the hypothesis is contradictory, that is to say it is an impossible fiction.(p206 L)

Thus the fiction of a finite material universe, the whole of which moves about in an infinite empty space, cannot be admitted. It is altogether unreasonable and impractical. For besides the fact that there is no real space outside the material universe, such an action would be without purpose; it would be working without doing anything, agendo nihil agere. No change which could be observed by any one whatever would be occurring. Such things are the imaginings of philosophers with incomplete notions, who make of space an absolute reality. (215 L)

The Aristotelians and the Cartesians, who do not admit the existence of a true void, replied to this experiment of M.Guericke's as well as to the experiment made by M. Torricelli of Florence (who emptied the air out of a glass tube by means of mercury), by saying that there is no vacuum at all in the tube or in the container since the glass has subtle pores, through which rays of light, magnetic rays, and other very fine things can pass. And I am of their opinion. (p217 L)

36. As I objected that space, taken as something real and absolute without bodies, would be a thing eternal, impassive, and independent of God, our author has tried to elude this difficulty by saying that space is a property of God. (p218 L)
( Clarke as ‘our author’)

..in order to have the idea of place, and consequently of space, it is enough to consider these relations and the rules of their changes, without needing to picture any absolute reality beyond the things whose situation is being considered. (p221 L)

But I grant that there is a difference between a genuine absolute movement of a body and a simple relative change of its situation with respect to another body. (p225 L)

And as to this objection that space and time are quantities, or rather things having quantity, and that situation and order are not such, I reply that order also has its quantity: there is that which precedes and that which follows, there is distance or interval. Relative things have their quantity as well as absolutes: for example, ratios or proportions in mathematics have their quantity and are measured by logarithms, and yet they are relations. Thus although time and space consist in relations, they have their quantity none the less. (p225 L)

63. But it is nowise follows that matter is eternal and necessary, unless we suppose that space is eternal and necessary: an altogether ill-founded supposition. (p226 L)

..whatever renders us more capable of reflecting on more perfect objects and in a more perfect manner, also makes us naturally perfect. But the present condition of our life forces us to have a great number of confused thoughts which do not make us naturally perfect. Such is the knowledge of customs, genealogies and languages, and indeed all historical knowledge of facts both civil and natural. (p233 L)

In a word, the only knowledge which can make us perfect is the knowledge of reasons in themselves, or of eternal and necessary truths, especially those truths which are most comprehensive and which bear most relation to the Sovereign Being. (p234 L)

The human race, considered in relation to the sciences which minister to our happiness, appears to me like a disorderly rabble marching in the darkness, having neither leader nor order, without password or other signals to regulate their march, or by which to know themselves. Instead of holding one another by the hand so as to guide one another and make sure of our way, we run about at random and to and fro, and even hurl ourselves one against another, far from helping and supporting each other. This means that we advance but little, or else that we know not where we are. We even plunge into morasses and shifting sands of doubt without end, wherein is nothing solid nor firm, or else we drag ourselves into the principles of very dangerous errors. Talibus in tenebris vitae tantisque periclis, it is given to no mortal to light a torch capable of dispersing this obscurity. Sects and leaders of sects serve merely to seduce us like the false lights of marsh fires; and it is left to the sun of our souls to enlighten us utterly, but in another life. Nevertheless, what we can do here is march together and in order, to share our journeyings, to make known the roads and to repair them: and finally to travel slowly, but with a firm unwavering tread, by the side of that pure and living stream of clear and simple knowledge, which has its source among us, which can serve as a comfort on our painful march, and as a thread which grows gradually larger and increases our knowledge, until at last it leads us, albeit by a roundabout way, to a delightful plain- I mean the most important practical truths which serve to content the mind and to preserve the health of the body, as far as this can be done by reason. (p238 L)

But at the present, men barely touch what is difficult and has not yet been attempted; but all run in crowds to what others have already done, where they cease not from copying and even from striving with one another. What one has built is first overthrown by another, who claims to found his reputation on the ruin of someone else's; but his own reign is no better established nor of longer duration. The fact is that they seek glory much more than truth, and seek rather to dazzle others than to enlighten themselves. To escape from this unhappy position, we must abandon the spirit of sect, and the affectation of novelty. We must imitate the geometers, who are not Euclideans nor Archimedeans. They are all for Euclid and all for Archimedes, because they are all for their common master, that is, divine truth .. (p238 L)

The death of the illustrious M. Huygens is an inestimable loss. Few know this as well as I do. He equalled, in my opinion, the reputation of Galileo and Descartes, and, with the help of what they had done, he surpassed their discoveries. In a word, he was one of the chief ornaments of our time. (p242 L)

We rightly regard bodies as being things, for even phenomena are real. But if any one seeks to regard bodies as being substances he will surely need some new principle of real unity. The man in Ireland (Berkeley) who impugns the reality of bodies seems neither to give adequate reasons nor to explain sufficiently what is in his mind. I suspect that he is one of those people who seek to become famous by their paradoxes. (p243 L)

I have learnt from experience that nothing defeats courage and removes the taste for beautiful things more than the importunate reflections we make on human misery, and on the vanity of our undertakings. It is the sole stumbling block of noble minds, on which it is all the easier to fail the more exhaulted one's genius. For ordinary minds do not pause over this great consideration about the future which in some sort includes the whole universe: but in compensation they are happier, for they taste apparent goods, without its occurring to them to destroy the pleasure by too exact a reflection. And since a happy folly is better than a bitter prudence, I think we should do well to turn deaf ears to reason and give ourselves up to custom, or else to reason for our diversion only, if there be no means of reconciling wisdom with contentment. But, God be praised, we are not so unfortunate, and Nature would be a stepmother, if that which makes our perfection were the cause of our wretchedness. (p248 L)

I was happy to be among men, but not happy about human nature. Often I thought with sorrow of the evils to which we are subjected, of the short duration of our life, the vanity of glory, the inconveniences which spring from pleasure, the illnesses which crush our very spirit; finally the annihilation of all our glories and all our perfections in the moment of death, which seems to reduce to nothing the fruits of our labours. These meditations made me melancholy. I had a natural love of doing good and knowing the truth. Yet it looked as though I were taking pains to no purpose, and as though a fortunate crime were better than a oppressed virtue, and the folly which satisfies preferable to the reason which gives pain. But I resisted these objections, and the better part triumphed in my mind through the consideration of the Divinity, who kept up my hopes by the expectation of a future capable of making up for everything. (p253 L)

Leibniz, Gottfried, Philosophical Writings, (1670) Everyman 1934


Introduction - Gottfried Leibniz Monadology, Monad - Leibniz Metaphysics - Leibniz Quotes - Links / Leibniz Philosophy - Top of Page

Leibniz Monadology Monad - On the Interconnection of All Things Leibniz Links / Metaphysics, Philosophy & Philosophers

Metaphysics: Problem of One and the Many - Brief History of Metaphysics and Solutions to the Fundamental Problems of Uniting the; One and the Many, Infinite and the Finite, Eternal and the Temporal, Absolute and Relative, Continuous and Discrete, Simple and Complex, Matter and Universe.
Metaphysics: Philosophy - Uniting Metaphysics and Philosophy by Solving Hume's Problem of Causation, Kant's Critical Idealism, Popper's Problem of Induction, Kuhn's Paradigm.
Cosmology -The supreme task of the physicist is to arrive at those universal elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built by pure deduction (Albert Einstein, 1954). The Wolff-Haselhurst Cosmology explains a Perpetual Finite Spherical Universe within an Infinite Eternal Space. The Spherical Standing waves determines the size of our finite spherical universe within an infinite Space (Matter is large not small, we only 'see' the Wave-Center / 'particle' effect which has greatly confused physics). Huygens' Principle explains how other matter's out waves combine to form our matter's spherical In-Waves, which then deduces both Mach's Principle and the redshift with distance (without assuming Doppler effect due to an expanding universe / Big Bang). This also explains how matter interacts with all other matter in the universe (why we can see stars) as matter is the size of the universe, but we only 'see' the high wave amplitude wave-centers / 'particles'.
Physics and Metaphysics - The Metaphysics of Space and Motion Sensibly Unites Albert Einstein's Relativity, Quantum Theory, and Cosmology. This 40 page Treatise (written over five years) will be published in 'What is the Electron' (Apeiron, 2005).
Huygens, Christiaan - Huygens' Principle explains how other Matter's Out-Waves form our Matter's In-Waves and deduces Hubble Redshift with distance. i.e. The Big Bang Theory is Incorrect.
Newton, Isaac - Newton's Absolute Space is correct. His error was to further assume the existence of Matter 'particles', Time, and Forces, which are caused by the Spherical Wave Motions of Space.
Tesla, Nikola - Tesla was influenced by Vedic Philosophy that all is one and dynamic. The Wave Structure of Matter confirms Nikola Tesla's Theories on Resonance and Transfer of Energy by Waves in Space. 'One day man will connect his apparatus to the very wheel work of the universe ... and the very forces that motivate the planets in their orbits and cause them to rotate will rotate his own machinery.'
Kant, Immanuel - Space and Motion (not Time) as Synthetic a priori Foundations for Human Knowledge and Reason. From Kantian Idealism to Realism.
Spinoza, Benedictus de - The Wave Structure of Matter in One Infinite Eternal Space explains Spinoza's Substance (God is Nature) and the Interconnection of all things to One Thing and the Importance of (Wave) Motion in the Universe.

Help Humanity

"You must be the change you wish to see in the world."
(Mohandas Gandhi)

Albert Einstein"When forced to summarize the general theory of relativity in one sentence: Time and space and gravitation have no separate existence from matter. ... Physical objects are not in space, but these objects are spatially extended. In this way the concept 'empty space' loses its meaning. ... The particle can only appear as a limited region in space in which the field strength or the energy density are particularly high. ...
The free, unhampered exchange of ideas and scientific conclusions is necessary for the sound development of science, as it is in all spheres of cultural life. ... We must not conceal from ourselves that no improvement in the present depressing situation is possible without a severe struggle; for the handful of those who are really determined to do something is minute in comparison with the mass of the lukewarm and the misguided. ...
Humanity is going to need a substantially new way of thinking if it is to survive!" (Albert Einstein)


Biography: Geoffrey Haselhurst, Philosopher of Science, Theoretical Physics, Metaphysics, Evolution. Our world is in great trouble due to human behaviour founded on myths and customs that are causing the destruction of Nature and climate change. We can now deduce the most simple science theory of reality - the wave structure of matter in space. By understanding how we and everything around us are interconnected in Space we can then deduce solutions to the fundamental problems of human knowledge in physics, philosophy, metaphysics, theology, education, health, evolution and ecology, politics and society.

This is the profound new way of thinking that Einstein realised, that we exist as spatially extended structures of the universe - the discrete and separate body an illusion. This simply confirms the intuitions of the ancient philosophers and mystics.

Given the current censorship in physics / philosophy of science journals (based on the standard model of particle physics / big bang cosmology) the internet is the best hope for getting new knowledge known to the world. But that depends on you, the people who care about science and society, realise the importance of truth and reality.

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Just click on the Social Network links below, or copy a nice image or quote you like and share it. We have a wonderful collection of knowledge from the greatest minds in human history, so people will appreciate your contributions. In doing this you will help a new generation of scientists see that there is a simple sensible explanation of physical reality - the source of truth and wisdom, the only cure for the madness of man! Thanks! Geoff Haselhurst (Updated September, 2018)

A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it. (Max Planck, 1920)

  
  
    
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