Important Note (September, 2012) - I have submitted an essay to a competition on the foundations of physical reality. It explains how matter and fields are just two different ways that space vibrates. It is very simple and obvious once understood, has profound consequences for humanity, our sense of self in the universe knowing that we vibrate with everything around us. Please read it, rate it, and I will reply to all comments. Thanks, Geoff haselhurst (11th Sept. 2012)

Site Introduction (2012): Despite several thousand years of failure to correctly understand physical reality (hence the current postmodern view that this is impossible) there is an obvious solution.
Simply unite Science (Occam's Razor / Simplicity) with Metaphysics (Dynamic Unity of Reality) and describe reality from only one substance existing, as Leibniz wrote;
'Reality cannot be found except in One single source, because of the interconnection of all things with one another'.
Given we all experience many minds and many material things, but always in one common Space, we are thus required to describe physical reality in terms of Space. We then find there is only one solution, a Wave Structure of Matter (WSM) where the electron is a spherical standing wave. See Wave Diagrams.
In hindsight the error was obvious, to try and describe an interconnected reality with discrete 'particles', which then required forces / fields to connect them in space and time. This was always just a mathematical solution which never explained how matter was connected across the universe.

I realise that there are a lot of 'crackpot' theories about truth and reality on the internet, but it is easy to show that the Wave Structure of Matter is the correct solution as it deduces the laws of Nature (the fundamentals of Physics & Philosophy) perfectly (there are no opinions). While the Wave Structure of Matter is obvious once known, to begin it will seem strange simply because it takes time for our minds to adjust to new knowledge.

For those who are religious / spiritual, I think Albert Einstein expresses the enlightened view of God. He writes 'I believe in Spinoza's God who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of what exists, not in a God who concerns himself with the fates and actions of human beings.' This harmony arises from a Wave Structure of Matter in Space (we are all interconnected in this space that we all commonly experience). This unity of reality (God, Brahman, Tao, Spirit, Energy, Light, Vibration) is central to all major world religions, thus their common moral foundation of 'Do unto others as to thyself' as the other is part of the self.

Please help our world (human society / life on earth) by sharing this knowledge.
Clearly our world is in great trouble due to human overpopulation and the resultant destruction of Nature, climate change and the pollution of air, land and water. The best solution to these problems is to found our societies on truth and reality rather than past myths and customs (which invariably cause harm).
We are listed as one of the Top Philosophy Websites on the Internet with around 600,000 page views each week, and rank in the top 20 in Google for many academic search terms - so we just need a bit of help to get in the top five. Given the Censorship in Physics / Philosophy of Science Journals (founded on the standard model / particle physics) the internet is clearly the best way to get new knowledge visible to the world.
A world now in great need of wisdom from truth and reality.
Sincerely,
Geoff Haselhurst - Karene Howie - Full Introduction - Email - Nice Letters - Share this Knowledge

In a time of universal deceit - telling the truth is a revolutionary act. (George Orwell)
You must be the change you wish to see in the world. (Mohandas Gandhi)
All that is necessary for evil to succeed is for good men to do nothing. (Edmund Burke)
Hell is Truth Seen Too Late. (Thomas Hobbes)

Spinoza

Philosophy - Famous Philosopher - (Baruch) Benedictus de Spinoza (1632 - 1677)
Discussion on Metaphysics / Philosophy of Spinoza
One Infinite Substance (God, Nature, Space) & the Interconnected Motion of Matter

Spinoza Pictures - Biography - Quotes / Quotations 'Ethics'

'Deus sive Natura' (God or Nature)
.... we are a part of nature as a whole, whose order we follow. (Spinoza, Ethics, 1673)


Introduction - Spinoza Metaphysics One Substance - Spinoza Motion - Spinoza Ethics Quotes - Spinoza Philosophy Links - Top of Page

Spinoza - A substance cannot be produced from anything else : it will therefore be its own cause, that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence appertains to the nature of it. Introduction to Spinoza

Baruch Spinoza was born in Amsterdam in 1632 into a Jewish family. He had a Jewish education, resisted orthodoxy and was later excommunicated of heresy and changed his name to Benedictus de Spinoza in 1656 (commonly spelt 'Benedict'). The Christians didn't think much of Spinoza either (though his whole philosophy is based on God) and the orthodox accused him of atheism.
Despite such ill treatment and unpopularity (his main philosophical work 'Ethics' was published posthumously) Spinoza lived a simple and noble life polishing lenses, displaying an indifference to money, fame and power. As Spinoza writes;

A free man, who lives among ignorant people, tries as much as he can to refuse their benefits. .. He who lives under the guidance of reason endeavours as much as possible to repay his fellow’s hatred, rage, contempt, etc. with love and nobleness. (Spinoza, Ethics)

Spinoza's Ethics is written in five parts, in a highly logical style of definitions, propositions and proofs. It begins with his Metaphysics, 'Concerning God', and then later addresses the Nature of Mind, Emotions, Intellect, Reason and Will.
For Spinoza, God and Nature were One. In Ethics he describes God as of One Infinite Eternal Substance which exists.

Except God no substance can be granted or conceived. .. Everything, I say, is in God, and all things which are made, are made by the laws of the infinite nature of God, and necessarily follows from the necessity of his essence. (Spinoza, Ethics)

So from Spinoza's Metaphysics, we can understand that humans (and our minds) are necessarily united to the whole, since there is only one substance; reality is a unity which we call God or Nature.

Spinoza also realised the connection of Motion and Time, as he writes;

No one doubts but that we imagine time from the very fact that we imagine other bodies to be moved slower or faster or equally fast. We are accustomed to determine duration by the aid of some measure of motion. (Spinoza, Ethics)

Further, Spinoza shows great insight into the Interconnected Motions of Matter;

When a number of bodies of the same or different size are driven so together that they remain united one with the other, or if they are moved with the same or different rapidity, so that they communicate their motions one to another in a certain ratio, those bodies are called reciprocally united bodies (corpora invicem unita), and we say that they all form one body or individual, which is distinguished from the rest by this union of the bodies. (Spinoza, Ethics, p50)

The purpose of this webpage on the Metaphysics / Philosophy of Spinoza is to unite his ideas of One Infinite Eternal Substance, Interconnection and Motion. Recent discoveries of the properties of Space and the Wave Structure of Matter (Wolff, Haselhurst) suggests that we can understand the One Thing which exists and connects the Many Things, as One Infinite Space which exists with the properties of a Wave Medium. The Spherical Standing Wave Motion of Space causes matter's activity and the phenomena of Time. This confirms Aristotle and Spinoza's connection of Motion and Time, and most significantly connects these two things back to one thing Space.
Please see below for a (very short) introduction to the Metaphysics of Space and Motion and the Wave Structure of Matter.

This webpage on the Metaphysics / Philosophy of Spinoza is an 'evolving work in progress', with many quotes needed to be written up and explained from this new metaphysical foundation.
We greatly appreciate any comments on how we can improve this website and its content. So please feel free to write to us.

Geoff Haselhurst, Karene Howie, Email

He who has a true idea, knows at that same time that he has a true idea, nor can he doubt concerning the truth of the thing.
(Spinoza, Ethics, 1673)


Introduction - Spinoza Metaphysics One Substance - Spinoza Motion - Spinoza Ethics Quotes - Spinoza Philosophy Links - Top of Page

Spinoza - A substance cannot be produced from anything else : it will therefore be its own cause, that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence appertains to the nature of it. Metaphysics of Spinoza, One Infinite Eternal Substance

But if men would give heed to the nature of substance they would doubt less concerning the Proposition that Existence appertains to the nature of substance: rather they would reckon it an axiom above all others, and hold it among common opinions. For then by substance they would understand that which is in itself, and through itself is conceived, or rather that whose knowledge does not depend on the knowledge of any other thing. (Spinoza, 1673)

Spinoza (with Aristotle) understood the importance of Motion, most significantly, Spinoza was particularly aware of the importance of the relative and interconnected Motions of Matter; (as becomes evident when we later consider the Human Body and Mind, and our unique Human Identity).

When a number of bodies of the same or different size are driven so together that they remain united one with the other, or if they are moved with the same or different rapidity, so that they communicate their motions one to another in a certain ratio, those bodies are called reciprocally united bodies (corpora invicem unita), and we say that they all form one body or individual, which is distinguished from the rest by this union of the bodies. (Spinoza, 1673)

Space is Infinite

As only One thing, Space, exists, there can be no boundary to Space (as a boundary is between two things) thus Space is unbounded and therefore Infinite. As Blake famously wrote;

If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything would be seen as it is, infinite. (Blake)

Spinoza states the logic of One Infinite Substance;

No two or more substances can have the same attribute and it appertains to the nature of substance that it should exist. It must therefore exist finitely or infinitely. But not finitely. For it would then be limited by some other substance of the same nature which also of necessity must exist: and then two substances would be granted having the same attribute, which is absurd. It will exist, therefore, infinitely. (Spinoza)

Space is Continuous

There can be no 'Particles' because 'Particles' require two things - the 'Particle' and the Space around the 'Particle', thus Space is a continuous medium. Or as Aristotle says;

This shows us two things: you cannot have parts of the infinite and the infinite is indivisible. (Aristotle)

Space is Ageless and Eternal

There are two separate arguments for an ageless and eternal Space which logically support one another;
i) As only one thing, Space, exists, there can be no creation of Space as creation requires two things (Space, and that which is not Space but created Space) thus Space is Ageless and Eternal.

A substance cannot be produced from anything else : it will therefore be its own cause, that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence appertains to the nature of it. (Spinoza, 1673)

ii) Time is a consequence of the Finite Velocity of Waves in Space, thus it takes time for a Wave to flow from place to place. Time does not exist as a thing in itself, it is, like the 'Particle', an effect of Waves in Space, not a cause! Thus Time only applies to Waves in Space (i.e. matter) and not to Space itself. Therefore Space was not created for this requires the concept of time (that the Space that now exists was created at some time in the past) thus Space is Ageless and Eternal. (Space simply exists.)

It need hardly be pointed out that with things that do not change there is no illusion with respect to time, given the assumption of their unchangeability. (Aristotle)


Introduction - Spinoza Metaphysics One Substance - Spinoza Motion - Spinoza Ethics Quotes - Spinoza Philosophy Links - Top of Page

Spinoza - A substance cannot be produced from anything else : it will therefore be its own cause, that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence appertains to the nature of it. Spinoza on Motion, the Interconnected Motions of Matter

No one doubts but that we imagine time from the very fact that we imagine other bodies to be moved slower or faster or equally fast. We are accustomed to determine duration by the aid of some measure of motion. (Spinoza, Ethics)

When a number of bodies of the same or different size are driven so together that they remain united one with the other, or if they are moved with the same or different rapidity, so that they communicate their motions one to another in a certain ratio, those bodies are called reciprocally united bodies (corpora invicem unita), and we say that they all form one body or individual, which is distinguished from the rest by this union of the bodies. (Spinoza, Ethics, p50)

The Spherical Standing Wave Motion of Space causes matter's activity and the phenomena of Time. This confirms Aristotle and Spinoza's connection of Motion and Time, and most significantly connects these two things back to one thing Space.

Motion must always have been in existence, and the same can be said for time itself, since it is not even possible for there to be an earlier and a later if time does not exist. Movement, then, is also continuous in the way in which time is - indeed time is either identical to movement or is some affection of it. (There is, however, only one continuous movement, namely spatial movement, and of this only circular rotation.) (Aristotle, Metaphysics)

 


Introduction - Spinoza Metaphysics One Substance - Spinoza Motion - Spinoza Ethics Quotes - Spinoza Philosophy Links - Top of Page

Spinoza - A substance cannot be produced from anything else : it will therefore be its own cause, that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence appertains to the nature of it. Spinoza Quotes, 'Ethics' (1673)

Introduction

"The fundamental atheism of Spinoza," said David Hume, "is the doctrine of the simplicity of the universe and the unity of that substance in which he supposes both thought and matter to inhere." (p.vii)

"The next thing to be considered," says Locke, "is how bodies produce ideas in us; and that is manifestly by impulse, the only way which we can conceive bodies to operate in," and "it is evident that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies, to the brain or the seat of sensation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them." (p.ix)

Part I- Concerning God

III. I understand substance (substantia) to be that which is in itself and is conceived through itself: I mean that, the conception of which does not depend on the conception of another thing from which it must be formed.

IV. An Attribute (attributum) I understand to be that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance.

V. By Mode (modus) I understand the Modifications (affectiones) of a substance or that which is in something else through which it may be conceived. (p1)

PROP. VII. Existence appertains to the nature of substance.
PROOF- A substance cannot be produced from anything else: it will therefore be its own cause, that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence appertains to the nature of it. (Spinoza, Ethics, p4)

PROP. VIII. All Substance is necessarily infinite.
PROOF- No two or more substances can have the same attribute and it appertains to the nature of substance that it should exist. It must therefore exist finitely or infinitely. But not finitely. For it would then be limited by some other substance of the same nature which also of necessity must exist: and then two substances would be granted having the same attribute, which is absurd. It will exist, therefore, infinitely. (Spinoza, Ethics, p4)

As to call anything finite is, in reality, a denial in part, and to call it infinite is the absolute assertion of the existence of its nature, it follows, therefore, that all substances must be infinite. (Spinoza, Ethics, p5)

But if men would give heed to the nature of substance they would doubt less concerning Prop 7 (Existence appertains to the nature of substance): rather they would reckon it an axiom above all others, and hold it among common opinions. For then by substance they would understand that which is in itself, and through itself is conceived, or rather that whose knowledge does not depend on the knowledge of any other thing; (Spinoza, Ethics, p5)

PROP. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.
Proof- If it is divisible, the parts into which it is divided will either retain the nature of substance or it will not. In the first case, several substances would be given having the same nature, which (Prop 5) is absurd. In the second case, a substance absolutely infinite could cease to be which is also absurd.
Corollary- From this it follows that no substance, and consequently no corporeal substance, in so far as it is a substance, can be divided into parts.
Note- That substance is indivisible can be seen more easily from this, that the nature of substance cannot be conceived except as infinite, and that by a part of a substance nothing else can be conceived than a finite substance, which involves an obvious contradiction.

PROP. XIV. Except God no substance can be granted or conceived.
PROOF- As God is a being absolutely infinite, to whom no attribute expressing the essence of substance can be denied, and as he necessarily exists, if any other substance than God be given, it must be explained by means of some attribute of God, and thus two substances would exist possessing the same attribute, which is absurd; and so no other substance than God can be granted, and consequently not even be conceived.
COROLLARY 1. - Hence it distinctly follows that God is one alone, i.e. there is none like him, or in the nature of things only one substance can be granted, and that is absolutely infinite ..
COROLLARY 2. – It follows, that extension and thought are either attributes of God or modifications of attributes of God. (Spinoza, Ethics, p11)

..But I at least have proved with sufficient clearness, I think, that no substance can be produced or created from another. Moreover (in Prop 14) we have shown that save God no substance can be granted or conceived. Hence we conclude that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God. (Spinoza, Ethics, p12)

.. but that they suppose an infinite quantity to be measurable and composed of finite parts; and from the absurdities which thence follow they cannot conclude anything else than that an infinite quantity is not measurable nor composed of finite parts. (Spinoza, Ethics, p13)

Everything, I say, is in God, and all things which are made, are made by the laws of the infinite nature of God, and necessarily follows from the necessity of his essence. (Spinoza, Ethics, p14-5)

Prop. XIX. God and all the attributes of God are eternal.
Proof- God is a substance, which necessarily exists, that is, to whose nature existence appertains, or (what is the same thing) from whose definition existence itself follows accordingly it is eternal. (Spinoza, Ethics, p18)

Prop. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or whatever thing that is finite and has a determined existence, cannot exist nor be determined for action unless it is determined for action and existence by another cause which is also finite and has a determined existence; and again, this cause also cannot exist nor be determined for action unless it be determined for existence and action by another cause which is also finite and has a determined existence: and so on to infinity.
Proof- Whatever is determined for existence or action is so determined by God (Prop. 26, and Coroll., Prop. 24). But that which is finite and has a determined existence cannot be produced from the absolute nature of any attribute of God: for anything that follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must be infinite and eternal (Prop. 21). It must have followed, therefore, either from God or some attribute of his, in so far as it is considered as modified in some mode: for save substance and modes nothing is granted (Ax. 1, and Def. 3 and 5) and modes (Coroll, Prop. 25) are nothing else than modifications of attributes of God.
Note- As certain things must have been produced immediately by God, for example, those things which necessarily follow from his absolute nature, by means of these first causes, which nevertheless cannot exist nor even be conceived without God, it follows that God is the proximate cause of those things immediately produced by him, absolutely, not, as some would have it, in his kind. For the effects of God cannot exist or be conceived without their cause (Prop. 15, and Coroll., Prop. 24). It follows, again, that God cannot be said in truth to be the remote cause of individual things unless we would thus distinguish these from the things which are immediately produced by God, or rather which follow from his absolute nature. For we understand by a remote cause one which is in no wise connected with its effect. But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on God that without him they can neither exist nor be conceived. (Spinoza, Ethics, p23)

Prop. XXIX. In the nature of things nothing contingent is granted, but all things are determined by the necessity of divine nature for existing and working in a certain way.
Proof- Whatever is, is in God. But God cannot be called a contingent thing: for (by Prop. 11) he exists of necessity and not contingently. Again, the modes of divine nature do not follow from it contingently, but of necessity (Prop. 16), and that either in so far as divine nature be considered absolutely or as determined for certain action (Prop. 27). Now God is the cause of these modes, not only in so far as they simply exist (Coroll., Prop. 24), but also in so far as they are considered as determined for the working of anything (Prop. 26). For if they are not determined by God, it is impossible, not contingent indeed, that they should determine themselves; and on the other hand, if they are determined by God, it is impossible and in no wise contingent for them to render themselves undetermined. Wherefore all things are determined by the necessity of divine nature, not only for existing, but also for existing and working after a certain manner, and nothing contingent is granted.
Note- Before proceeding, I would like to explain, or rather remind you, what we must understand by active and passive nature (natura naturans and natura naturata), for I think that from the past propositions we shall be agreed that by nature active we must understand that which is in itself and through itself is conceived, or such attributes of substance as express eternal and infinite essence, that is God, in so far as he is considered as a free cause. But by nature passive I understand all that follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any one of his attributes, that is, all the modes of the attributes of God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God, and which cannot exist or be conceived without God. (Spinoza, Ethics, p23-4)

Prop. XXX. Intellect, finite or infinite in actuality (actus), must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God and nothing else.
Proof- A true idea must also agree with its ideal (Ax. 6), that is (as is self-evident), that which is contained in the intellect objectively must of necessity be granted in nature. But in nature (Coroll.1, Prop.14), only one substance can be granted, and that is God, and only such modifications can be granted (Prop. 15) as are in God and cannot exist or be conceived without God. Therefore, intellect finite or infinite in actuality must comprehend the attributes and modifications of God and nothing else. (Spinoza, Ethics, p24)

Prop. XXX1. The intellect in actuality, whether it be finite or infinite, as will, desire, love, etc, must be referred not to active, but passive nature.
Proof- Now by intellect (as is self-evident) we do not understand absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking which differs from other modes, such as desire and love, etc, and therefore must (Def. 5) be conceived through absolute thought: moreover (Prop. 15 and Def. 6), it must be so conceived through some attribute of God which expresses eternal and infinite essence of thought, that without it, it can neither exist nor be conceived. On this account (Note, Prop. 29), like the other modes of thinking, the intellect must be referred not to active but passive nature. (Spinoza, Ethics, p24-5)

Prop. XXXII. Will can only be called a necessary cause, not a free one.
Proof- Will, like intellect, is only a certain mode of thinking, and therefore (Prop. 28) any single volition cannot exist or be determined for performing anything unless it be determined by some other cause, and this one again by another, and so on to infinity. Now if will be supposed infinite, it must then be determined for existence and action by God, in so far, not as he is an infinite substance, but as he has an attribute expressing infinite and eternal essence of thought (Prop. 23).
So in whatever way it be conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by which it is determined for existence or action: and therefore (Def. 7) it cannot be said to be a free cause, but only a necessary one.
Corollary 1. – Hence it follows that God does not act from freedom of will.
Corollary 11. – Hence it follows again that will and intellect hold the same place in the nature of God as motion and rest, and that, absolutely, as with all natural things which (Prop. 29) must be determined by God in a certain way for existence and action. For will, like all other things, needs a cause by which it is determined in a certain way for existence or action. And although from a given will or intellect infinite things follow, yet it cannot be said on that account that God acts from freedom of will any more than it can be said that, as infinite things follow from motion and rest (for infinite things follow from these too), God acts from freedom of motion and rest. Wherefore will does not appertain to the nature of God any more than the rest of the things of nature, but holds the same place in God’s nature as motion and rest, and all other things which we have shown to follow from the necessity of divine nature, and to be determined by it for existence and action in a certain way. (Spinoza, Ethics, p25-6)

Prop. XXXIII. Things could not have been produced by God in any other manner or order than that which they were produced.
Proof- All things must have followed of necessity from a given nature of God (Prop. 16), and they were determined for existence or action in a certain way by the necessity of divine nature (Prop. 29). And so if things could have been of another nature or determined in another manner for action so that the order of nature were different, therefore, also, the nature of God could be different than it is now: then (Prop. 11) another nature of God must exist, and consequently two or more Gods could be granted, and this (Coroll. I, Prop.14) is absurd. Wherefore things could not have been produced in any other way or order, etc.
Note 1- Although I have shown more clearly than the sun at noonday that there is absolutely nothing in things by which we can call them contingent, yet I would wish to explain here in a few words what is the signification of contingent (contingens); but first that of necessary (necessarium) and impossible (impossible).
Anything is said to be necessary either by reason of its essence or its cause. For the existence of anything necessarily follows either from its very essence or definition, or from a given effecting cause. A thing is said to be impossible by reason of these same causes: clearly for that its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or that no external cause can be given determined for the production of such a thing. But anything can in no wise be said to be contingent save in respect to the imperfection of our knowledge. For when we are not aware that the essence of a thing involves a contradiction, or when we are quite certain that it does not involve a contradiction, and yet can affirm nothing with certainty concerning its existence, as the order of causes has escaped us, such a thing can seem neither necessary nor impossible to us : and therefore we call it either contingent or possible. (Spinoza, Ethics, p26)

.. they want to ascribe to God a freedom far different to that which has been propounded by us. They attribute to him absolute will. .. that although it be conceded that will appertains to the essence of God, yet it nevertheless follows that things could not have been created in any other manner or order than that in which they were created; and this will be easy to show if first we consider the very things which they themselves grant, namely, that it depends solely on the decree and will of God that each thing is what it is, for otherwise God would not be the cause of all things. They grant further, that all the decrees of God have been appointed by him through and from all eternity: for otherwise it would argue mutability and imperfection in God. But as in eternity there are no such things given as when, before, or after, hence it follows merely from the perfection of God that he never can or could decree anything else than what is decreed, or that God did not exist before his decrees, nor without them could he exist. (Spinoza, Ethics, p27)

For his intellect and will concerning things created and their order is the same in respect to his essence and perfection, in whatever manner they may be conceived. Furthermore, all the philosophers, I have seen, concede that no such thing as potential intellect in God can be granted, but only actual. But as they make no distinction between his intellect and will and his essence, being all agreed in this, it follows then that if God had another actual intellect and will, he must necessarily also have another essence; and thence, as I concluded in the beginning, that, were things produced in any other way than that in which they were, God’s intellect and will, that is, as has been granted, his essence, also must have been other than it is, which is absurd. (Spinoza, Ethics, p28)

Prop. XXXIV. The power of God is the same as his essence.
Proof- It follows from the mere necessity of the essence of God that God if his own cause, the cause of all things. Therefore the power of God, by which he and all things are and act, is the same as his essence. (Spinoza, Ethics, p29)

Prop. XXXV. Whatever we conceive to be in the power of God necessarily exists.
Proof- Now whatever is in the power of God must be so comprehended in his essence that it follows necessarily from it, and so it necessarily exists. (Spinoza, Ethics, p29)

Prop. XXXVI. Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow.
Proof- Whatever exists expresses in a certain and determined manner either the nature or essence of God, that is whatever exists expresses in a certain and determined way the power of God, which is the cause of all things, and therefore from it some effect must follow. (Spinoza, Ethics, p29)

In these propositions I have explained the nature and properties of God: that he necessarily exists: that he is one alone: that he is the free cause of all things and in what manner: that all things are in God, and so depend upon him that without him they could neither exist nor be conceived: and finally, that all things were predetermined by God, not through his free or good will, but through his absolute nature or infinite power. (Spinoza, Ethics, p30)

It will suffice here for me to take as a basis of argument what must be admitted by all: that is, all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that all have a desire of acquiring what is useful; that they are conscious, moreover, of this. From these premises it follows then, in the first place, that men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and as they are ignorant of the causes by which they are led to wish and desire, they do not dream of their existence. It follows, in the second place, that men do all things with an end in view, that is, they seek what is useful. Whence it comes to pass that they always seek out the final causes of things performed, and when they have divined these they cease, for clearly then they have no cause of further doubt. If they are unable to learn these causes from some one, nothing remains for them but to turn to themselves and reflect what could induce them personally to bring about such a thing, and thus they necessarily estimate other natures by their own. Furthermore, as they find in themselves and without themselves many things which aid them not a little in their quest of things useful to themselves, as, for example, eyes for seeing, teeth for mastication, vegetables and animals for food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding fish, they consider these things like all natural things to be made for their use; and as they know that they found these things as they were, and did not make them themselves, herein they have cause for believing that some one else prepared these things for their use. Now having considered things as means, they cannot believe them to be self-created; but they must conclude from the means which they are wont to prepare for themselves, that there is some governor or governors, endowed with human freedom, who take care of all things for them and make all things for their use. They must naturally form an estimate of the nature of these governors from their own, for they receive no information as regards them: and hence they come to say that the Gods direct all things for the use of men, that men may be bound down to them and do them the highest honour. Whence it has come about that each individual has devised a different manner in his own mind for the worship of God, that God may love him above the rest and direct the whole of nature for the gratification of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. Thus this misconception became a superstition, and fixed its roots deeply in the mind, and this was the reason why all diligently endeavoured to understand and explain the final causes of all things. But while they have sought to show that nature does nothing in vain (that is, nothing which is not of use to man), they appear to have shown nothing else than nature, the Gods and men are all mad. (Spinoza, Ethics, p30-1)

For it was easier for them to place this among other unknown things whose use they knew not, and thus retain their present and innate condition of ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their philosophy and reconstruct it. (Spinoza, Ethics, p32)

.. nature has no fixed aim in view, and that all final causes are merely fabrications of men. (Spinoza, Ethics, p32)

.. all things in nature proceed eternally from a certain necessity and with the utmost perfection. (Spinoza, Ethics, p32)

For example, if a stone falls from a roof on the head of a passer-by and kills him, they will show by their method of argument that the stone was sent to fall and kill the man; for if it had not fallen on him by God’s will, how could so many circumstances (for often very many circumstances concur at the same time) concur by chance? You will reply perhaps: “That the wind was blowing, and that the man had to pass that way, and hence it happened.” But they will retort: “Why was the wind blowing at that time? and why was the man going that way ata that time?” If again you reply: “That the wind had then arisen on account of the agitation of the sea the day before, and the previous weather had been calm, and that the man was going that way at the invitation of a friend,” they will again retort, for there is no end to their questioning: “Why was the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at the time?” And thus they will pursue you from cause to cause until you are glad to take refuge in the will of God, that is, the asylum of ignorance. (Spinoza, Ethics, p33)

.. those who do not understand the things of nature are certain of nothing concerning those things, but only imagine them and mistake their imaginations for intellect, they firmly believe there is order in things, and are ignorant of them and their own nature. Now when things are so disposed that when they are represented to us through our senses we can easily imagine and consequently easily remember them, we call them well-ordered; and on the other hand, when we cannot do so, we call them ill-ordered or confused. (Spinoza, Ethics, p34)

And such things as affect the ear are called noises, and form discord or harmony, the last of which has delighted men to madness, so that they have believed that harmony delights God. Nor have there been wanting philosophers who assert that the movements of the heavenly spheres compose harmony. (Spinoza, Ethics, p35)

For although human bodies agree in many points, yet in many others they differ, and that which seems to one good may yet to another seem evil; to one order, yet to another confusion; to one pleasing, yet to another displeasing, and so on, for I need not treat further of these, as this is not the place to discuss them in detail, and indeed they must be sufficiently obvious to all. For it is in every one’s mouth: “As many minds as men,” “Each is wise in his own manner,” “As tastes differ, so do minds” - all of which proverbs show clearly enough that men judge things according to the disposition of their minds, and had rather imagine things than understand them. For if they understood things, my arguments would convince them at least, just as mathematics, although they might not attract them. (Spinoza, Ethics, p35)

.. all the arguments by which the vulgar are wont to explain nature are nothing else than modes of imagination, and indicate the nature of nothing whatever, but only the constitution of the imagination; and although they have names as if they were entities existing outside the imagination, I call them entities, not of reality, but of the imagination; (Spinoza, Ethics, p36)

For many are wont thus to argue: If all things have followed from the necessity of the most perfect nature of God, whence have so many imperfections in nature arisen? For example, the corruption of things even to rottenness, the ugliness of things which often nauseate, confusion, evil, sin, etc. But as I have just said, these are easily confuted. For the perfection of things is estimated solely from their nature and power; nor are things more or less perfect according as they are useful or useless to men. (Spinoza, Ethics, p36)

These are the misunderstandings which I have stopped here to point out. If any grains of them still remain, they can be easily dispersed by means of a little reflection. (Spinoza, Ethics, p36)

Spinoza - A substance cannot be produced from anything else : it will therefore be its own cause, that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence appertains to the nature of it. Part II- Concerning The Nature and Origin Of The Mind

I now pass on to explain such things as must follow from the essence of God or of a being eternal and infinite: not all of them indeed (for they must follow in infinite number and in infinite modes), but only such as can lead us by the hand (so to speak) to the knowledge of the human mind and its consummate blessedness. (Spinoza, Ethics, p37)

I. By Body (corpus) I understand that mode which expresses in a certain determined manner the essence of God in so far as he is considered as an extended thing. (Spinoza, Ethics, p37)

III. By Idea I understand a conception of the mind which the mind forms by reason of its being a thinking thing.
Explanation- I say conception rather than perception, for the name perception seems to point out that the mind is passive to the object, while conception seems to express an action of the mind. (Spinoza, Ethics, p37)

VI. REALITY and PERFECTION (realitas et perfectio) I understand to be one and the same thing.

VII. By INDIVIDUAL THINGS (res singulares) I understand things which are finite and have a determined existence; but if several of them so concur in one action that they all are at the same time the cause of one effect, I consider them all thus far as one individual thing. (Spinoza, Ethics, p38)
AXIOMS
I. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that is, in the order of nature it can equally happen that this or that man exists as that he does not exist.
II. Man thinks.
V. We neither feel nor perceive any individual things save bodies and modes of thinking. (Spinoza, Ethics, p38)

PROPOSITIONS
Prop 1. Thought (cogitatio) is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing. (Spinoza, Ethics, p38)

Prop 11. Extension (extensio) is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing. (Spinoza, Ethics, p39)

Prop 111. In God there is granted not only the idea of his essence, but also the idea of all the things which follow necessarily from his essence.

..the power of God is nothing else than the active essence of God: and accordingly it is impossible for us to conceive God inactive as to conceive him non-existent. And if I may pursue this subject further, I could furthermore point out that the power which the generality attribute to God is not only human power (showing that the conceive God to be a man or like one), but also involves want of power. But I do not wish to return to this subject so many times. I only ask the reader again and again to turn over in his mind once and again what I have written on this subject. (Spinoza, Ethics, p40)

Prop. IV. The idea of God from which infinite things in infinite modes follow can only be one. (Spinoza, Ethics, p40)

Prop. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.
Proof- This is clear from Ax. 4, Part I. For the idea of everything that is caused depends on the knowledge of the cause of which it is an effect. (Spinoza, Ethics, p41)

Note- Before we proceed any further, let us call to mind what we have already shown above: that whatever can be perceived by infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance, invariably appertains to one substance alone; and consequently thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same thing, which is now comprehended through this and that attribute. Thus also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two manners, which certain of the Jews seem to have perceived but confusedly, for they said that God and his intellect and the things conceived by his intellect were one and the same thing. For example, a circle existing in nature and the idea of an existing circle, which is also in God, is one and the same thing, though explained through different attributes. And this whether we consider nature under the attribute of extension or under the attribute of thought or under any other attribute, we shall find one and the same order and one and the same connection of causes: that is, the same things follow in either case. Nor did I say that God is the cause of an idea in so far as he is a thinking thing, with any other reason than that the formal being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a proximate cause through some other mode of thought, and that again through another, and so on to infinity: so that as long as things are considered as modes of thought we must explain by the mere attribute of thought the order or connection of causes of all nature; and in so far as things are considered as modes of extension, the order also of the whole of nature must be explained through the mere attribute of extension; and I understand the same of other things. Wherefore of things as they are in themselves, God is in truth the cause, forasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes; nor can I explain this more clearly at present. (Spinoza, Ethics, p41-2)

Prop X. The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man, or, again, substance does not constitute the form of man.
Proof- The being of substance involves necessary existence. If therefore the being of substance appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man also must necessarily be granted, and consequently man must necessarily exists, which is absurd.
Note- This proposition may also be proved from Prop 5, Part 1, to wit, that two substances cannot be granted having the same nature. For as many men may exist, therefore that which constitutes the form of man is not the being of substance. Again, this proposition is manifest from the other properties of substance, to wit, that substance is in its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, etc., as can easily be seen by all. (Spinoza, Ethics, p44)

For divine nature, which they ought to have considered before all things, for that it is prior in knowledge and nature, they have thought to be last in the order of knowledge, and things which are called the objects of the senses they have believed to be prior to all things. (Spinoza, Ethics, p45)

Proof- The essence of man is constituted by certain modes of attributes of God .. (Spinoza, Ethics, p45-6)

For an infinite thing (Prop. 21 and 23, Part 1) must always necessarily exist. (Spinoza, Ethics, p46)

Note- Here doubtless the readers will become confused and will recollect many things which will bring them to a standstill: and therefore I pray to them to proceed gently with me and form no judgement concerning these things until they have read all. (Spinoza, Ethics, p46)

Prop. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, or a certain mode of extension actually existing and nothing else. (Spinoza, Ethics, p47)

Corollary- Hence it follows that man consists of mind and body, and that the human body exists according as we feel it.
Note- From these we understand not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also what must be understood by the union of the mind and body. But in truth no one will be able to understand this adequately or distinctly unless, at first, he is sufficiently acquainted with the nature of our body. (Spinoza, Ethics, p47)

Axiom I. All bodies are either moving or stationary
Axiom II. Each body is moved now slowly now more fast.
Lemma I. Bodies are reciprocally distinguished with respect to motion or rest, quickness or slowness, and not with respect to substance. (Spinoza, Ethics, p48)

Lemma II. All bodies agree in certain respects.
Proof- All bodies agree in this, that they involve the conception of one and the same attribute: and again that they may be moved more quickly or more slowly or be absolutely in motion or absolutely stationary. (Spinoza, Ethics, p48)

Lemma III. A body in motion or at rest must be determined for motion or rest by some other body, which, likewise, was determined for motion or rest by some other body, and this by a third and so on to infinity.
Proof- Bodies are individual things, which (Lemma 1) are distinguished reciprocally with respect to motion or rest: and, therefore (Prop 28, Part 1) each must necessarily be determined for motion or rest by some other individual thing, that is (Prop. 6, Part 11), by another body, which (Ax. 1) also is either in motion or at rest. But this one also, by the same reason, cannot be in motion or at rest unless it was determined for motion or rest by another body, and that again (by the same reason) by another, and so on to infinity. (Spinoza, Ethics, p49)

When a number of bodies of the same or different size are driven so together that they remain united one with the other, or if they are moved with the same or different rapidity, so that they communicate their motions one to another in a certain ratio, those bodies are called reciprocally united bodies (corpora invicem unita), and we say that they all form one body or individual, which is distinguished from the rest by this union of the bodies. (Spinoza, Ethics, p50)

Lemma IV. If from a body or individual which is composed of several bodies certain ones are removed, and at the same time the same number of bodies of the same nature succeed to their place, the individual will retain its nature as before without any change of its form. (Spinoza, Ethics, p51)

Lemma VII. Moreover, the individual thus composed retains its nature whether as a whole it be moved or remain at rest, whether it be moved in this or that direction, provided that each part retains its motion and communicates it as before to the other parts. (Spinoza, Ethics, p51)

Prop. XIV. The human mind is apt to perceive many things, and more so according as its body can be disposed in more ways.
Proof- Now the human body is affected by external bodies in many ways and disposed to affect external bodies in many ways. But the human mind must perceive all things which happen in the human body. Therefore the human mind is apt to perceive many things, and more so, etc. (Spinoza, Ethics, p52-3)

Prop. XVI. The idea of every mode in which the human body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human body and at the same time the nature of the external body. (Spinoza, Ethics, p53)

Corollary- The mind can regard external bodies by which the human body was once affected, although they do not exist, nor are present, as if they were present. (Spinoza, Ethics, p54)

.. the modifications of the human body, the ideas of which represent to us external bodies as if they were present, we shall call the images of things, although they do not recall the figures of things; and when the mind regards bodies in this manner we say it imagines them. (Spinoza, Ethics, p55)

Prop. XVIII. If the human body has once been affected at the same time by two or more bodies, when the mind afterwards remembers any one of them it will straightway remember the others. (Spinoza, Ethics, p55)

Note- Hence we clearly understand what is memory (memoria). For it is nothing else than a certain concatenation of ideas involving the nature of things which are outside the human body, and this concatenation takes place according to the order and concatenation of the modifications of the human body. (Spinoza, Ethics, p55-6)

:and thus one passes from the thought of one thing to the thought of another according as his habit arranged the images of things in his body.

Prop. XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the human body, nor does it know it to exist save through ideas of modifications by which the body is affected. (Spinoza, Ethics, p56)

.. the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes (Prop. 7, Part II). It follows, therefore, that this idea or knowledge of the human mind is in God and is referred to God in the same manner as the knowledge or idea of the human body. (Spinoza, Ethics, p57)

The parts composing the human body do not appertain to the essence of that body save in so far as they reciprocally communicate their motions in a certain ratio. (Spinoza, Ethics, p59)

..the mind and body, are one and the same individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, and now under the attribute of extension. (Spinoza, Ethics, p58)

Proof- The parts composing the human body do not appertain to the essence of that body save in so far as they reciprocally communicate their motions in a certain ratio ... (Spinoza, Ethics, p59)

Prop. XXVI. The human mind perceives no external body as actually existing save through ideas of modifications of its body.
Proof- If the human body is affected in no way by any external body, then neither is the idea of the human body, that is, the human mind, affected in any wise by the idea of the existence of the external body, or, in other words, it does not perceive in any way the existence of that external body. But in so far as the human body is affected in any way by any external body, thus far, it perceives the external body.
Corollary- In so far as the human mind imagines an external body, thus far it has no adequate knowledge of it.
Proof- When the human mind regards external bodies through the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say it imagines: nor can the human mind in any other way imagine external bodies as actually existing. And therefore, in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has no adequate knowledge of them. (Spinoza, Ethics, p60)

Prop. XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred to the human mind alone, are not clear and distinct but confused. (Spinoza, Ethics, p61)
Corollary- Hence it follows that the human mind, whenever it perceives a thing in the common order of nature, has no adequate knowledge of itself, nor of its body, nor of external bodies, but only a confused and mutilated knowledge thereof. (Spinoza, Ethics, p62)

Prop. XXXV. Falsity consists in privation of knowledge which is involved by inadequate or mutilated and confused ideas. (Spinoza, Ethics, p64)

For instance, men are mistaken in thinking themselves free; and this opinion consists of this alone, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. This, therefore, is their idea of liberty, that they should know no cause of their actions. For that which they say, that human actions depend on the will, are words which have no idea. For none of them know what is will and how it moves the body; those who boast of this and feign dwellings and habitations of the soul, provoke either laughter or disgust. (Spinoza, Ethics, p64)

Prop. XXXVII. That which is common to all (See Lemma 2), and that which is equally in a part and in the whole, do not constitute the essence of an individual thing.
Proof- If you deny this, conceive, if it can be, that it does constitute the essence of an individual thing, namely, the essence of B. Then (Def.2, Part II) it cannot be conceived nor exist without B. And this is contrary to the hypothesis. Therefore it does not appertain to the essence of B, nor can it constitute the essence of any other individual thing. (Spinoza, Ethics, p65)

Prop. XXXVIII. Those things which are common to all, and which are equally in a part and in the whole, can only be conceived as adequate. (Spinoza, Ethics, p65)

Corollary- Hence it follows that certain ideas or notions are granted common to all men. For (Lemma 2) all bodies agree in certain things which must adequately or clearly and distinctly be perceived by all. (Spinoza, Ethics, p65)

Prop. XL. Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in the mind, are also adequate. (Spinoza, Ethics, p66)

It is not surprising that so many controversies should have arisen among philosophers who wished to explain things of nature merely by images of things. (Spinoza, Ethics, p68)

+ 3 types of knowledge; senses, logic, intuition. (Spinoza, Ethics, p68)

Prop. XLIII. He who has a true idea, knows at that same time that he has a true idea, nor can he doubt concerning the truth of the thing. (Spinoza, Ethics, p69)

Moreover, no one doubts but that we imagine time from the very fact that we imagine other bodies to be moved slower or faster or equally fast. (Spinoza, Ethics, p71)

Note- By existence I do not mean here duration, that is, existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly and as a certain form of quantity. I speak of the very nature of existence, which is assigned to individual things by reason of the fact that they follow from the eternal necessity of the nature of God, infinite in number and in infinite ways. I speak, I say, of the very existence of individual things in so far as they are in God. For although each one is determined by another individual thing for existing in a certain manner, yet the force wherewith each of them persists in existing follows from the eternal necessity of the nature of God. (Spinoza, Ethics, p73)

Prop. XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.
Note- As all things are in God, and through him are conceived, it follows that we can deduce from this knowledge many things which we may adequately know and therefore form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in Note 2, Prop 40, Part II. (Intuition)

Prop. XLVIII. There is no mind absolute or free will, but the mind is determined for willing this or that by a cause which is determined in its turn by another cause, and this one again by another, and so on to infinity.
Proof- The mind is a fixed and determined mode of thinking, and therefore cannot be the free cause of its actions, or it cannot have the absolute faculty of willing and unwilling: but for willing this or that it must be determined by a cause which is determined by another, and this again by another etc .. (Spinoza, Ethics, p74-5)

.. I understand by will the faculty, not the desire, of affirming and denying: I understand, I repeat, the faculty by which the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, and not the desire by which the mind takes a liking or an aversion to anything. (Spinoza, Ethics, p75)
(+ p 76) will and intellect the one and same thing

Spinoza - A substance cannot be produced from anything else : it will therefore be its own cause, that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence appertains to the nature of it. Part III- Concerning The Origin And Nature Of Emotions

Most who have written on the emotions, the manner of human life, seem to have dealt not with natural things which follow the general laws of Nature, but with things which are outside the sphere of nature: they seem to have conceived man in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. For they believe that man disturbs rather than follows the course of nature, and that he has absolute power in his actions, and is not determined in them by anything else than himself. They attribute the cause of human weakness and inconstancy not to the ordinary power of nature, but to some defect or other in human nature, wherefore they deplore, ridicule, despise, or, what is most common of all, abuse it: and he that can carp in the most eloquent or acute manner at the weakness of the human mind is held by his fellows as almost divine. Yet excellent men have not been wanting (to whose labour and industry I feel myself much indebted) who have written excellently in great quality on the right manner of life, and left to men counsels full of wisdom: yet no one determined, as far as I know, the nature and force of the emotions and what the mind can do in opposition to them for their constraint. (Spinoza, Ethics, p83)

Nothing happens in nature which can be attributed to a defect of it: for nature is always the same and one everywhere, and its ability and power of acting, that is, the laws and rules of nature according to which all things are made and changed from one form into another, are everywhere and always the same, and therefore one and the same manner must there be of understanding the nature of all things, that is, by means of the universal laws and rules of nature. For such emotions as hate, wrath, envy, etc. considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and ability of nature as other individual things: and therefore they acknowledge certain causes through which they are understood, and have certain properties equally worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing, the contemplation alone which delights us. (Spinoza, Ethics, p84)

III. BY EMOTION (affectus) I understand the modifications of the body by which the power of action in the body is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the ideas of these modifications.
Explanation- Thus if we can be the adequate cause of these modifications, then by the emotion I understand an ACTION (actio), if otherwise a PASSION (passio). (Spinoza, Ethics, p84-5)

Hence it follows that the mind is more or less subject to passions according as it has more or less inadequate ideas, and, on the other hand, to more action the more adequate ideas it has. (Spinoza, Ethics, p86)

..surely human affairs would be far happier if the power in men to be silent were the same as that to speak. But experience more than sufficiently teaches that men govern nothing with more difficulty than their tongues, and can moderate their desires more easily than their words. (Spinoza, Ethics, p88)
(+ p88-9) decision of the mind, freedom.

Prop. VI Everything in so far as it is in itself endeavours to persist in its own being.
Proof- Individual things are modes in which the attributes of God are expressed in a certain determined manner, that is, they are things which express in a certain determined manner the power of God whereby he is and acts. (Spinoza, Ethics, p91)

Prop. VII. The endeavour wherewith a thing endeavours to persist in its being is nothing else than the actual essence of that thing. (Spinoza, Ethics, p91)

we endeavour, wish, desire, or long for nothing because we deem it good; but on the other hand, we deem a thing good because we endeavour, wish for, desire, or long for it. (Spinoza, Ethics, p92)

..the idea which denies the existence of our body is opposed to the mind.
Prop. XI. Whatever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of action of our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of our mind. (Spinoza, Ethics, p92-3)
..the idea which constitutes the essence of the mind involves the existence of the body as long as the body exists. Again it follows from what we showed in Coroll, prop. 8, Part II and its Note, that the present existence of our mind depends on this alone, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Then we showed that the power of the mind by which it imagines and remembers things depends on this, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Whence it follows that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining is taken away as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body. (Spinoza, Ethics, p93)
(+p102) external body

Spinoza - A substance cannot be produced from anything else : it will therefore be its own cause, that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence appertains to the nature of it. Part IV- On Human Servitude, Or The Strength Of The Emotions

Humans lack of power in moderating and checking the emotions I call servitude. For man who is submissive to his emotions is not in power over himself, but in the hands of fortune to such an extent that he is often constrained, although he may see what is better for him, to follow what is worse. I purpose accordingly in this part to show the reason for this, and what there is good and bad in the emotions. (Spinoza, Ethics, p141)

We see thus that men have been wont to call things of nature perfect or imperfect from prejudice rather than from a true knowledge, for we showed in the appendix of the first part that nature does not act with an end in view: for that eternal and infinite being we call God or nature acts by the same necessity of its nature as that by which it exists. Therefore the reason or cause why God or nature acts, or why they exist, is the one and same; therefore, as God exists with no end in view, he cannot act with any end in view, but has no principle or end either in existing or acting. A cause, then, that is called final is nothing save human appetite itself in so far as it is considered as the principle or primary cause of anything. (Spinoza, Ethics, p142)

By perfection in general I shall understand, reality, that is, the essence of anything, in so far as it exists and operates in a certain manner, without any consideration of time. (Spinoza, Ethics, p144)

+p144, definitions of good, bad, contingent, possible.

Prop II. We are passive in so far as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived through itself without others.
Proof- We are said to be passive when something takes place in us which we are only the partial cause (Def. 2, Part III), that is (Def I, Part III), something which cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature. We are passive, therefore, in so far as we are part of nature which cannot be conceived through itself without other parts. (Spinoza, Ethics, p146)

Prop. VIII. The knowledge of good or evil is nothing else than the emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious of it.
Proof- We call that good or evil which is useful or the contrary for our preservation, that is, which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders our power of acting. (Spinoza, Ethics, p149)

Prop. XV. Desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil can be destroyed or checked by many other desires which arise from emotions by which we are assailed. (Spinoza, Ethics, p152)

.. we can never bring it about that we need nothing outside ourselves for our preservation, and that in order to live we need have no commerce with things which are without us. If, moreover, we looked at our minds, our intellect would be more imperfect if the mind were alone and understood nothing save itself. Many things are therefore without us which are very useful to us, and therefore much to be desired. Of these, none can be considered more excellent than those which agree with our nature. For if two individuals of the same nature were to combine, they would form one individual twice as strong as either individual; there is nothing more useful to man than man. (Spinoza, Ethics, p155)

From which it follows that men who are governed by reason, that is, men who, under the guidance of reason, seek what is useful to them, desire nothing for themselves which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind, and therefore they are just, faithful and honourable. (Spinoza, Ethics, p155)

Prop. XXII. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this virtue of endeavouring to preserve oneself. (Spinoza, Ethics, p157)

Prop. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is determined to do anything, by the fact that he has inadequate ideas cannot absolutely be said to act from virtue, but only in so far as he is determined by the fact that he understands. (Spinoza, Ethics, p157)

Prop. XXIV. To act absolutely according to virtue is nothing else in us than to act under the guidance of reason, to live so, and to preserve one’s being (these three have the same meaning) on the basis of seeking what is useful to oneself. (Spinoza, Ethics, p158)

Prop. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly good or evil save what is truly conducive to understanding or what prevents us from understanding. (Spinoza, Ethics, p159)

Prop. XXVIII. The greatest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the greatest virtue of the mind is to know God.
Proof- The greatest thing that a mind can understand is God, that is, a being absolutely infinite, and without which nothing can either be or be conceived. Therefore the thing of the greatest use or good to the mind is the knowledge of God. (Spinoza, Ethics, p159-60)

But he who endeavours to lead the rest by reason, not impulse, acts humanely and benignly, and is most constant in mind. (Spinoza, Ethics, p166)

(+ p 167) the difference between true virtue and weakness, human right over animals.
(+ p 168) society, disobedience, sin cannot be conceived in a natural state but only in a civil state.

Again, in a natural state no one is master of anything by common consent, nor can there be anything in nature which can be said to belong to this man and not to that, but all things belong equally to all men; and accordingly in a natural state no wish of rendering to each man his own can be conceived, nor of taking away from a man what belongs to him, that is, in a state of nature nothing takes place that can be called just or unjust, but only in an civil state, where it is determined by common consent what belongs to this man or that. From this it is apparent that just and unjust, sin and merit, are merely extrinsic notions, not attributes which explain the nature of the mind. (Spinoza, Ethics, p169)

Proof- The human body needs for its preservation many other bodies; but that which constitutes the form of the human body consists of this, that its parts convey one to the other their motions mutually in a certain ratio. (Def. before Lemma 4, which see after Prop.13, Part II). Therefore that which brings it about that the proportion of motion and rest which the parts of the body have one to the other is preserved, preserves the form of the human body, and consequently brings it to pass that the human body can be affected in many ways: and therefore it is good. Again, that which brings it to pass that the parts of the human body assume some other proportion of motion and rest, bring it to pass that the human body assumes another form, that is (as is self-evident, and as we gave notice towards the end of the preface of this part), that the human body is destroyed, and consequently rendered entirely inapt for being affected in many modes and therefore it is bad. (Spinoza, Ethics, p169-70)

(+ p171, what is conducive of the common society is useful, merriment and melancholy)

.. the more we are affected with pleasure, thus we pass to a greater perfection, that is, we necessarily participate of the divine nature. To make use of things and take delight in them as much as possible (not indeed to satiety, for that is not to take delight) is the part of a wise man. It is, I say, the part of the wise man to feed himself with moderate pleasant food and drink, and to take pleasure with perfumes, with the beauty of growing plants, dress, music, sports and theatres, and other places of this kind which man may use without any hurt to his fellows. For the human body is composed of many parts of different nature which continuously stand in need of new and varied nourishment, so that the body as a whole may be equally apt for performing those things which can follow from its nature and consequently so that the mind also may be equally apt for understanding many things at the same time. This manner of living agrees best with our principles and the general manner of life: wherefore if there be nay other, this manner of life is the best, and in all ways to be commended .. (Spinoza, Ethics, p173-4)

Prop. XLVI. He who lives under the guidance of reason endeavours as much as possible to repay his fellow’s hatred, rage, contempt, etc. with love and nobleness.
Proof- All emotions of hatred are bad; and therefore he who lives according to the precepts of reason will endeavour as much as possible to bring it to pass that he is not assailed by emotions of hatred, and consequently he will endeavour to prevent any one else from suffering those emotions. But hatred is increased by reciprocated hatred, and, on the contrary, can be demolished by love in such a way that hatred is transformed into love. Therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour to repay another’s hatred, etc. with love, that is nobleness.
Note- he who wishes to revenge injuries by reciprocal hatred will live in misery. But he who endeavours to drive away hatred by means of love, fights with pleasure and confidence: he resists equally one or many men, and scarcely needs at all the help of fortune. (Spinoza, Ethics, p174)

Note- He who rightly knows that all things follow from the necessity of divine nature, and come to pass accordingly to the eternal natural and regular laws, will find nothing at all that is worthy of hatred, laughter, or contempt, nor will he deplore any one ; but as far as human virtue can go, he will endeavour to act well, as people say, and to rejoice. (Spinoza, Ethics, p176)

Prop. LIX. For all actions for which we are determined by an emotion which is a passion we can be determined without that emotion by reason alone. (Spinoza, Ethics, p181)

(+ p183) desire
By reason of desire which arises from reason we directly follow what is good and indirectly avoid what is evil. (Spinoza, Ethics, p185)

.. the difference between a man who is led by opinion or emotion and one who is led by reason. The former, whether he will or not, performs things of which he is entirely ignorant; the latter is subordinate to no one, and only does those things which he knows to be of primary importance in his life, and which on that account he desires the most; and therefore I call the former a slave, but the latter free, concerning whose habits and manner of life we may here say a few words. (Spinoza, Ethics, p187)

Prop. LXVII. A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life. (Spinoza, Ethics, p187)

Prop. LXX. A free man, who lives among ignorant people, tries as much as he can to refuse their benefits. (Spinoza, Ethics, p188)

Prop. LXXIII. A man who is guided by reason is more free in a state where he lives according to common law than in solitude where he is subject to no law. (Spinoza, Ethics, p190)
(+ p190) a strong man

IV. It is therefore extremely useful in life to perfect as much as we can the intellect or reason, and of this alone does the happiness or blessedness of man consist: for blessedness (beatitudo) is nothing else than satisfaction of mind which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God. But to perfect the intellect is nothing else than to understand God and his attributes and actions which follow from the necessity of his nature. Wherefore the ultimate aim of a man who is guided by reason, that is, his greatest desire by which he endeavours to moderate all the others, is that whereby an adequate conception is brought to him of all things which can come within the scope of his intelligence. (Spinoza, Ethics, p192)

Nor can it come to pass that man is not a part of nature and not follow its common order of things; but if he be thrown among individuals who agree with him in nature, by that very fact his power of acting is aided and fostered. And if, on the other hand, he be thrown among individuals who agree with him in no wise in nature, he shall scarcely be able to accommodate himself with them without a great change in his nature. (Spinoza, Ethics, p192)

XI. Minds are conquered not by arms, but by love and magnanimity.
XII. It is above all things useful to men that they unite their habits of life (consuetudines) and bind themselves together with such bonds by which they can most easily make one individual of them all, and to do those things especially which serve for the purpose of confirming friendship. (Spinoza, Ethics, p193)

XIV. Therefore, although men are as a rule governed in everything by their desire or lust, yet from their common society or association many more advantages than disadvantages arise or follow. Wherefore it is but right to bear the injuries arising therefrom with equanimity, and to be zealous for those who serve to keep peace and friendship.
XV. The things which give birth to harmony or peace are those which have reference to justice, equity and honourable dealing. (Spinoza, Ethics, p194)

XX. As for what concerns matrimony, it is certain that it is in concord with reason if the desire of uniting bodies is engendered not from beauty alone, but also from the love of bearing children and wisely educating them: and moreover, if the love of either of them, that is, of husband or wife, has for its cause not only beauty, but also freedom of mind. (Spinoza, Ethics, p194-5)

.. it may be completely brought about that man endeavours to live not from fear or aversion, but moved only by an emotion of pleasure according to the dictates of reason, as far as in them lies.
XXVI. Save men we do not know any individual thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice or which we may join to us in bonds of friendship or any other kind of habit: and therefore whatever exists in nature besides man, reason does not postulate that we should preserve for our advantage, but teaches us that we should preserve or destroy it according to our various need, or adapt it in any manner we please to suit ourselves.
XXVII. The advantage we reap from things which are outside us, together with experience and knowledge which we acquire from the fact that we observe them and change them from one form to another, is the principle preservation of the body: and in this manner those things are especially useful which can so feed and nourish the body that all its parts can rightly perform their office. For the more the body is apt to be affected in many modes or to affect external bodies in many modes, the more apt is the mind for thinking. But there seems to be very few things of this kind in nature. Wherefore for the nourishment of the body as it is required it is necessary to use many foods of different nature: for the human body is composed of many parts of different nature which need continuous and varied nourishment so that the whole body may be equally fit to discharge all the duties which can follow from its nature, and consequently that the mind may be equally fit for the conception of many things.
XXVIII. But for preparing these things the force or strength of one man would scarcely suffice if men did not indulge in mutual exchange and aid. This exchange is now carried on by means of money. Whence it has come to pass that the image of money occupies the principle place in the mind of the vulgar, for they can scarcely imagine any kind of pleasure unless it be accompanied with the idea of money as the cause. (Spinoza, Ethics, p195-6)

But those who know the true use of money and moderate their desire of money to their requirements alone are content with very little. (Spinoza, Ethics, p196)

XXXII. But human power is considerably limited and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes and therefore we have not absolute power of adapting things which are outside us for our usage. But we shall not bear with equanimity those things which happen to us contrary to that which a regard for our advantage postulates, if we are conscious that we have performed our duty and cannot extend the power we have to such an extent as to avoid those things, and moreover, that we are a part of nature as a whole, whose order we follow. (Spinoza, Ethics, p197)

Spinoza - A substance cannot be produced from anything else : it will therefore be its own cause, that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence appertains to the nature of it. Part V- Concerning The Power Of The Intellect Or Human Freedom

(p201, on Descartes mind/body)

Prop. I. Just as thoughts and the ideas of the mind are arranged and connected in the mind, so in the body its modifications or the modifications of things are arranged and connected according to their order.
Proof- The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things (Prop 7, Part II.), and vice versa, the order and connection of things is the same (Coroll, Prop 6 and 7, Part II) as the order and connection of ideas. Wherefore just as the order and connection of ideas in the mind if made according to the order and connection of the modifications of the body (Prop. 18, Part II), so vice versa (Prop. 2, Part III), the order and connection of the modifications of the body is made according as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and connected in the mind. (Spinoza, Ethics, p202)

Prop. III. An emotion which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.
Proof- An emotion which is a passion is a confused idea. If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of this emotion, this idea will be distinguished from the emotion in so far as it has reference to the mind alone by reason alone: and therefore (Prop. 3, Part III) the emotion will cease to be a passion.
Corollary- Therefore the more an emotion becomes known to us, the more it is within our power and the less the mind is passive to it. (Spinoza, Ethics, p203)

.. it follows that every one has power of understanding himself and his emotions, if not absolutely at least in part clearly and distinctly, and consequently of bringing it about that he is less passive to them. For this purpose care must be taken especially that we understand clearly and distinctly each emotion and to what extent it may grow, so that the mind may be determined by the emotion to think those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives and in which it acquiesces entirely: and thus the emotion is separated from the thought of an external cause and united to true thoughts. (Spinoza, Ethics, p204)

Prop. VI. In so far as the mind understands all things as necessary it has more power over the emotions or is less passive to them.
Proof- The mind understands all things as necessary, and to be determined for existing and acting by the infinite connection of causes.
Note- The more this knowledge, namely, that things are necessary, is applied to individual things which we imagine more distinctly and vividly, the greater is this power of the mind over the emotions, which is borne witness to be experience. (Spinoza, Ethics, p205)

Prop. IX. Emotion which has reference to many different causes which the mind regards at the same time as the emotion itself is less harmful, and we are less passive to it and less affected toward each cause than another emotion equally great which has reference to one alone or fewer causes.
Proof- An emotion is bad or harmful only in so far as the mind is prevented by it from thinking as much as before. And therefore that emotion by which the mind is determined for regarding many objects at the same time is less harmful than another equally great which detains the mind in the contemplation of one alone or fewer objects in such a manner that it cannot think of the others: (Spinoza, Ethics, p206)

Prop. X. As long as we are not assailed by emotions which are contrary to our nature we are able to arrange and connect the modifications of the body according to their intellectual order. (Spinoza, Ethics, p206-7)

Note- By this power of rightly arranging and connecting the modifications we can bring it to pass that we are not easily affected by evil emotions. For (Prop. &, Part V) greater force will be required to hinder emotions arranged and connected according to their intellectual order than if they were vague and uncertain. The best thing then we can bring to pass, as long as we have no perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to conceive some manner of living aright or certain rules of life, to commit them to memory, and to apply them continuously to the individual things which come in our way frequently in life, so that our imagination may be deeply affected with them and they may be always ready for us. (Spinoza, Ethics, p207)

Thus those who are badly received by their sweethearts think of nothing save the fickleness, deception and the other often related faults of womankind, all of which, however, they immediately forget as soon as they are received again. (Spinoza, Ethics, p208)

Prop. XI. The more any image has reference to many things, the more frequent it is, the more often it flourishes, and the more it occupies the mind.
Proof- The more an image or emotion has reference to many things, the more causes there are by which it can be excited and cherished, all of which the mind (hypothesis) regards at the same time with the emotion. And therefore the emotion is more frequent or more often flourishes, and it occupies the mind more. (Spinoza, Ethics, p209)

Prop. XII. The images of things are more easily joined to images which have reference to things which we understand clearly and distinctly than to others.
Proof- Things which we clearly and distinctly understand are either the common properties of things or what we deduce from them, and consequently they are more often excited in us. And therefore it can more easily happen that we should regard things at the same time with these than with other things, and consequently that they are associated with these more easily than with other things. (Spinoza, Ethics, p209)

Prop. XIV. The mind can bring it to pass that all the modification of the body or images of things have reference to the idea of God.
Proof- There is no modification of the body of which the mind cannot form a clear and distinct conception (Prop. 4, Part V). And therefore it can bring to pass (Prop. 15, Part I.) that all the images have reference to the idea of God. (Spinoza, Ethics, p209)

Prop. XVII. God is free from passions, nor is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.
Corollary- God, to speak strictly, loves no one nor hates any one. For God is affected with no emotion of pleasure of pain, and consequently loves no one nor hates any one. (Spinoza, Ethics, p210)

Again, it is to be noted that these unhealthy states of mind and misfortunes owe their origin for the most past to excessive love for a thing that is liable to many variations, and of which we may never seize the mastery. For no one is anxious or cares about anything that he does not love, nor do injuries, suspicions, enmities arise from anything else than love towards a thing of which no one is truly master. From this we can easily conceive what a clear and distinct knowledge, and principally that third kind of knowledge (concerning which see Note, Prop. 47, Part II), whose basis is the knowledge of God, can do with the emotions, namely, that if it does not remove them entirely in so far as they are passions (Prop. 3, with Note, Prop.4, Part V), at least it brings it about that they constitute the least possible part of the mind (see Prop. 14, Part V). Moreover, it gives rise to a love towards a thing immutable and eternal (Prop. 15, Part V) and of which we are in truth masters (Prop. 45, Part II), and which cannot be polluted by any evils which are in common love, but which can become more and more powerful (Prop. 15, Part V) and occupy the greatest part of the mind (Prop. 16, Part V) and occupy it. (Spinoza, Ethics, p213)

Prop. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the human body, but there is some part of it that remains eternal.
Proof- There is necessarily in God the conception or idea which expresses the essence of the human body which therefore is something necessarily which appertains to the essence of the human mind (Prop. 13, Part II). But we attribute to the human mind no duration which can be defined by time, save in so far as it expresses the actual essence of the human body, which is explained by means of duration and is defined by time, that is (Coroll, Prop. 8, Part II), we do not attribute duration save as long as the body lasts. But there is nevertheless something else which is conceived under a certain eternal necessity through the essence of God, this something will be necessarily the eternal part which appertains to the essence of the mind. (Spinoza, Ethics, p213-4)

Prop. XXIV. The more we understand individual things, the more we understand God.

Prop. XXV. The greatest endeavour of the mind and its greatest virtue is to understand things by the third class of knowledge.
Proof- The third class of knowledge proceeds from the adequate idea of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things (see its def. in Note 2, Prop. 40, Part II) and the more we understand things in this manner, the more (prev. Prop) we understand God. (Spinoza, Ethics, p215)

Prop. XXVII. From this third class of knowledge the greatest possible mental satisfaction arises.
Proof- The greatest virtue of the mind if to know God (Prop. 28, Part IV) or to understand according to the third class of knowledge (Prop. 25, Part V): and this virtue is the greater according as the mind knows more things by this class of knowledge (Prop. 24, Part V). And therefore he who knows things according to this class of knowledge, passes to the greatest state of perfection, and consequently (Def. Emo. 2) he is affected with the greatest pleasure, and that (Prop. 43, Part II) accompanied by the idea of himself and his virtue: and therefore (Def. Emo. 25) from this kind of knowledge the greatest satisfaction possible arises. (Spinoza, Ethics, p215)

Note- Things are conceived as actual in two ways by us, either in so far as we conceive them to exist with relation to certain time and space, or in so far as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of divine nature. But those which are conceived in this second manner as true or real we conceive under a certain species of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God. (Spinoza, Ethics, p216)

Corollary- Hence it follows that the part of the mind which remains, of whatever size it is, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind (Prop. 23 and 29, Part V) is the intellect through which alone we are said to perish is the imagination (prop. 21, Part V), through which alone we are said to be passive (Prop. 3, Part III, and Gen. Def. Emo.). (Spinoza, Ethics, p222)

..our mind, in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this one again by another, and so on to infinity: so that they all constitute at the same time the eternal and infinite intellect of God. (Spinoza, Ethics, p222)

Prop. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself: nor should we rejoice in it for that we restrain our lusts, but, on the contrary, because we rejoice therein we can restrain our lusts.
Proof- Blessedness consists of love towards God and this love arises from the third kind of knowledge. And therefore this love must be referred to the mind in so far as it is active, and therefore it is virtue itself (Def. 8, Part IV): which is the first point. Again, the more the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, the more it understands, that is, the more power it has over the emotions and the less passive it is to emotions which are evil. And therefore, by the very fact that the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, it has the power of restraining lusts, inasmuch as human power to restrain lusts consists of intellect alone. Therefore no one rejoices in blessedness because he restrained lusts, but, on the contrary, the power of restraining lusts arises from blessedness itself. (Spinoza, Ethics, p224)

If the road I have shown to lead to this is very difficult, it can yet be discovered. And clearly it must be very hard when it is so seldom found. For how could it be that it is neglected practically by all, if salvation were close at hand and could be found without difficulty? But all excellent things are as difficult as they are rare. (Spinoza, Ethics, p224)

Spinoza - A substance cannot be produced from anything else : it will therefore be its own cause, that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence appertains to the nature of it. Treatise On The Correction Of The Understanding
And on the way in which it may be directed towards a True Knowledge of Things

After experience had taught me that all things which frequently take place in ordinary life are vain and futile; when I saw that all things I feared and which feared me had nothing good or bad in them save in so far as the mind was affected by them, I determined at last to inquire whether there might be anything which might be truly good and able to communicate its goodness, and by which the mind might be affected to the exclusion of other things: (Spinoza, Ethics, p227)

Fame has also this great drawback, that if we pursue it we must direct our lives in such a way as to please the fancy of men, avoiding what they dislike and seeking what is pleasing to them. (Spinoza, Ethics, p228)

But the love towards a thing eternal and infinite alone feeds the mind with pleasure, and it is free from all pain; so it is much to be desired and to be sought out with all our might. (Spinoza, Ethics, p229)

But above all things, a method must be thought out of healing the understanding and purifying it at the beginning, that it may with the greatest success understand things correctly. From this every one will be able to see that I wish to direct all sciences in one direction or to one end, namely, to attain the greatest possible human perfection: (Spinoza, Ethics, p231)

IV. Finally, perception is that wherein a thing is perceived through its essence alone or through a knowledge of its proximate cause.
+ example (Spinoza, Ethics, p232-3)

+ knowledge, relativism p.235

From which also it is again clear that no one can know what is the greatest certainty, unless he have an adequate idea or the objective essence of anything, that is, certainty is the same thing as objective essence. (Spinoza, Ethics, p237)

.. an idea must agree in all respects with its formal essence, it is clear that in order that our mind may represent a true example of nature, it must produce all its ideas from the idea which represents the origin and source of all nature, so that it may become the source of other ideas. (Spinoza, Ethics, p239)

For thought is said to be true when it involves objectively the essence of some principle which has no cause, and is known through itself and in itself. (Spinoza, Ethics, p249)

.. we do not understand the primary elements of the whole of nature; whence, proceeding without order and confusing nature with abstract things which may yet be axioms, we confuse ourselves and pervert the order of nature. But we who proceed with the least abstraction and begin with the primary elements, that is, with the source and origin of nature as far back as possible- we, I say, if we do this, need have no fear of such deception. (Spinoza, Ethics, p251)

.. we are accustomed to determine duration by the aid of some measure of motion. (Spinoza, Ethics, p254)

As words are a part of imagination, that is according as they are composed in vague order in the memory owing to condition of the body, we can feign many conceptions, therefore it must not be doubted but that words, just as the imagination, can be the cause of many great errors, unless we take the greatest precautions with them. (Spinoza, Ethics, p256)

Let us avoid, moreover, another great cause of confusion which prevents the understanding from reflecting on itself. It is that we do not make a distinction between imagination and understanding, we think that those things which we easily imagine are clearer to us, and that we imagine we think we understand. So that those things which should be put last we put first, and thus the true order of progress is perverted and nothing may be legitimately be concluded. (Spinoza, Ethics, p256)

II. The conception or definition of a thing is required to be such that all the properties of that thing, regarded in itself and not conjoined with others, can be concluded from it. (Spinoza, Ethics, p258)


Introduction - Spinoza Metaphysics One Substance - Spinoza Motion - Spinoza Ethics Quotes - Spinoza Philosophy Links - Top of Page

Spinoza - A substance cannot be produced from anything else : it will therefore be its own cause, that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence appertains to the nature of it. Links / Spinoza Philosophy, Physics, Metaphysics, Pantheism

Metaphysics: Problem of One and the Many - Brief History of Metaphysics and Solutions to the Fundamental Problems of Uniting the; One and the Many, Infinite and the Finite, Eternal and the Temporal, Absolute and Relative, Continuous and Discrete, Simple and Complex, Matter and Universe.
Time - The Spherical Standing Wave Motion of Space causes matter's activity and the phenomena of Time. This confirms Aristotle and Spinoza's connection of Motion and Time, and most significantly connects these two things back to one thing Space. Movement, then, is also continuous in the way in which time is - indeed time is either identical to movement or is some affection of it. (Aristotle)
Cosmology
-The supreme task of the physicist is to arrive at those universal elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built by pure deduction (Albert Einstein, 1954). The Wolff-Haselhurst Cosmology explains a Perpetual Finite Spherical Universe within an Infinite Eternal Space.
Physics and Metaphysics - The Metaphysics of Space and Motion Sensibly Unites Albert Einstein's Relativity, Quantum Theory, and Cosmology. This 40 page Treatise (written over five years) will be published in 'What is the Electron' (Apeiron, 2005).
Theology: Pantheism Philosophy - Spinoza realised that God, Nature and Reality are One and the Same thing. All is God, All is One, All is Space and Motion.
Philosophy: Free Will Vs Determinism - Wave Structure of Matter explains Limited Free Will in a Necessarily Connected (Logical) Universe.
Philosophy: Morality Ethics - The Fundamental Morality of World Religions 'Do Unto Others ...'is Logically True as the Other is Part of Self.
Aurelius, Marcus - Famous Stoic Roman Emperor & his Meditations on our Interconnected Existence in the Universe & how we are to live. We should not say - I am an Athenian or I am a Roman but I am a Citizen of the Universe.
Leibniz, Gottfried - The Spherical Standing Wave Structure of Matter explains Leibniz's Monads (Monad = One) and how Matter and Universe are One Interconnected Whole.
Evolution: Ecology: Nature - Ecological Interconnection and the Importance of Nature explained by Wave Structure of Matter. Life (and Humanity) evolved from Nature and depend upon Nature for Survival.
Evolution: Nature One Gaia Cosmos - WSM explains both Ecology of Matter in the Universe and the Ecology of Life on Earth (Gaia).
Philosophy: Stoicism Zeno - Famous Roman Stoic Philosopher Zeno realised the Interconnection of All Things in the Universe.


Philosophy
On Love of Wisdom from Truth & Reality

In Eastern philosophy, the main terms used in Hinduism and Buddhism have dynamic connotations. The word Brahman is derived from the Sanskrit root 'brih' (to grow) and thus suggests a reality which is dynamic and alive. (Capra, 1972)
Eastern Philosophy: Buddhism Hinduism Taoism Confucianism
Greek philosophy begins with the preposterous fancy, that water is the origin of all things. Is it necessary to stop there & become serious? Yes ... because it contains the idea we find in all philosophy: everything is one! (Nietzsche, 1890)
Ancient Greek Philosophy: Stoicism, Quotes, Pictures
All things come out of the one and the one out of all things. ... I see nothing but Becoming. Be not deceived! The very river in which you bathe a second time is no longer the same one you entered before. (Heraclitus, 500 B.C.)
Heraclitus: Biography, Pictures, Philosophy Quotes
Are you not ashamed that you give your attention to acquiring as much money as possible, and care so little about wisdom and truth, which you never regard or heed at all? (Socrates, The Apology, 469 - 399 B.C.)
Socrates: Life & Death, Biography, Pictures, Quotes
The philosopher is in love with truth, that is, not with the changing world of sensation, which is the object of opinion, but with the unchanging reality which is the object of knowledge. (Plato, 429-347 B.C.)
Plato: Greek Philosopher. Republic Quotes, Biography
The life of theoretical philosophy is the best & happiest one can lead. Few are capable of it (and only then intermittently). For the rest, the second-best way of life, is moral virtue & practical wisdom. (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C.)
Aristotle: Politics & Philosophy Quotes, Biography, Pictures
Frequently consider the connection of all things in the universe. ... We should not say 'I am an Athenian' or 'I am a Roman' but 'I am a citizen of the Universe. (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 121-180 A.D.)
Marcus Aurelius: 'Meditations' Quotes, Biography, Pictures
We are a part of nature as a whole, whose order we follow. ... He who lives under the guidance of reason endeavours to repay his fellows hatred, rage & contempt with love and nobleness. (Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, 1632-1677)
Benedict de Spinoza: 'Ethics' Philosophy Quotes
Reality cannot be found except in One single source, because of the interconnection of all things with one another. I do not conceive of any reality at all as without genuine unity. (Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 1646 - 1716)
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Monad Philosophy Quotes
My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those principles are, which have introduced all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions into the several sects of philosophy. (George Berkeley, 1710)
George Berkeley: Philosophy Quotes, Biography, Pictures
And though the philosopher may live remote from business, the genius of philosophy, if carefully cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself throughout the whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on every art and calling. (David Hume, 1737)
David Hume: Biography, Pictures, Philosophy Quotes
It is the duty of philosophy to destroy the illusions which had their origin in misconceptions, whatever darling hopes and valued expectations may be ruined by its explanations. ... Pure reason is a perfect unity. (Immanuel Kant, 1781)
Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason Quotes
There is nothing more necessary than truth, everything else has only secondary value. One does not want to be deceived, under the supposition that it is injurious, dangerous, or fatal to be deceived. (Nietzsche, 1890)
Friedrich Nietzsche: Biography, Pictures, Philosophy Quotes
.. by nature man is a political animal. Men have a desire for life together, even when they have no need to seek each other's help. Common interest too is a factor in bringing them together, contributing to the good life of each. (Aristotle, Politics)
Politics: Political Science Globalisation Democracy, Utopia
Since philosophy is the art which teaches us how to live, and since children need to learn it as much as we do at other ages, why do we not instruct them in it? (Michel de Montaigne, Essays, 1592)
Philosophy of Education: Teaching Philosophy
Art is a selective re-creation of reality according to an artist's metaphysical value-judgments. An artist recreates those aspects of reality which represent his fundamental view of man's nature. (Ayn Rand, On Philosophy of Art)
Philosophy of Art: Renaissance Impressionist
Modern Art Gallery
If we take away the subject (Humans), or our senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear ... they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. (Immanuel Kant, 1781)
Philosophy of Mind: Idealism to Realism
Uniting Matter & Mind
.. the puzzles that constitute normal science exist only because no paradigm that provides a basis for scientific research ever completely resolves all its problems. (Thomas Kuhn, 1962)
Postmodern Philosophy Postmodernism Vs. Realism



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"You must be the change you wish to see in the world."
(Mohandas Gandhi)

Albert Einstein"When forced to summarize the general theory of relativity in one sentence: Time and space and gravitation have no separate existence from matter. ... Physical objects are not in space, but these objects are spatially extended. In this way the concept 'empty space' loses its meaning. ... The particle can only appear as a limited region in space in which the field strength or the energy density are particularly high. ...
The free, unhampered exchange of ideas and scientific conclusions is necessary for the sound development of science, as it is in all spheres of cultural life. ... We must not conceal from ourselves that no improvement in the present depressing situation is possible without a severe struggle; for the handful of those who are really determined to do something is minute in comparison with the mass of the lukewarm and the misguided. ...
Humanity is going to need a substantially new way of thinking if it is to survive!" (Albert Einstein)


Biography: Geoffrey Haselhurst, Philosopher of Science, Theoretical Physics, Metaphysics, Evolution. Our world is in great trouble due to human behaviour founded on myths and customs that are causing the destruction of Nature and climate change. We can now deduce the most simple science theory of reality - the wave structure of matter in space. By understanding how we and everything around us are interconnected in Space we can then deduce solutions to the fundamental problems of human knowledge in physics, philosophy, metaphysics, theology, education, health, evolution and ecology, politics and society.

This is the profound new way of thinking that Einstein realised, that we exist as spatially extended structures of the universe - the discrete and separate body an illusion. This simply confirms the intuitions of the ancient philosophers and mystics.

Given the current censorship in physics / philosophy of science journals (based on the standard model of particle physics / big bang cosmology) the internet is the best hope for getting new knowledge known to the world. But that depends on you, the people who care about science and society, realise the importance of truth and reality.

It is easy to help - just click on the social network sites (below) or grab a nice image / quote you like and add it to your favourite blog, wiki or forum. We are listed as one of the top philosophy sites on the Internet (600,000 page views / week) and have a wonderful collection of knowledge from the greatest minds in human history, so people will appreciate your contributions. Thanks! Geoff Haselhurst - Karene Howie - Email



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