I must confess that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investigation, that therefore it does not really exist. I must also confess that, though all the learned, for several ages, should have employed themselves in fruitless search upon any subject, it may still, perhaps, be rash to conclude positively that the subject must, therefore, pass all human comprehension. (David Hume, 1737)
.. the senses alone are not implicitly to be depended on; we must correct their evidence by reason, and by considerations, derived from the nature of the medium, the distance of the object, and the disposition of the organ, in order to render them, within their sphere, the proper criteria of truth and falsehood. (David Hume, 1737)
It is possible to maintain both that such things as chairs and tables are directly perceived and that our sense-experiences are causally dependent upon physical processes which are not directly perceptible. This is, indeed, a position which is very widely held, and is perfectly consistent. ... At the present moment there is indeed no doubt, so far as I am concerned, that this table, this piece of paper, this pen, this hand, and many other physical objects exist. I know that they exist, and I know it is on the basis of my sense-experiences. (Ayer, 1956)
Kant's doctrine that only what is unknowable is ultimately real, and Hume's doctrine that it is imagination which makes us believe in the existence of material bodies, are alike in doing violence to the concepts of the imagination, reality and knowledge which we actually employ. ... The criticisms made by both Kant and Hume of the metaphysical employment of concepts without regard to the conditions of their empirical use still stand. (Urmson, Western Philosophy and Philosophers, 1991)
While I absolutely agree with Ayer that objects do physically exist, it is likely that the introductory quotes about Hume and Kant, will seem difficult and confusing when first read. Fortunately it is the beauty of Truth to simplify and solve these formerly difficult problems which makes understanding so much easier. So please be patient and enjoy the journey through the ideas of two of the greatest philosophical minds to have existed. For as I shall explain, once the Truth is known (i.e. we understand how matter exists and is necessarily connected to other matter) then their difficult problems and paradoxes disappear, leaving a simple, sensible, logical solution to these most profound problems of human knowledge. Let me first begin with a few simple observations about the difference between Philosophy and Physics. Philosophy literally means 'Love of Wisdom' but as Aristotle says, we must know the Truth about the causes of things to be wise;
It is clear, then, that wisdom is knowledge having to do with certain principles and causes. But now, since it is this knowledge that we are seeking, we must consider the following point: of what kind of principles and of what kind of causes is wisdom the knowledge? (Aristotle, Metaphysics)
John Locke described Philosophy as; ... nothing but the true knowledge of things. Thus while Physics studies objects in terms of relationships that can be mathematically quantified, Philosophy must consider whether there is a language (non mathematical) which can correctly correspond to these 'Things' which Exist. As Aristotle astutely says;
And physics is in the same boat as mathematics. It studies the accidents and principles of entities, qua participating in process and not qua being. And in contrast we have said that primary science is the science of these things in so far as they, its subjects, are things that are, and not in regard to any other feature. Hence both physics and mathematics are to be considered mere parts of total understanding. (Aristotle, Metaphysics)
This then leads to the problems of how we can have 'True Knowledge', and consequently how the mind can think and know (Epistemology) the Truth about Things which Exist (Ontology). Thus we must understand the limitations of our mind and language (which we use to understand and convey this knowledge to others) and determine if these limitations can be overcome such that there can be certainty to our knowledge. As Ayer validly observes;
The quest for certainty has played a considerable part in the history of philosophy: it has been assumed that without a basis of certainty all our claims to knowledge must be suspect. (Ayer, 1956)
It appears that, in single instances of the operation of bodies, we never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover any thing but one event following another, without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates, or any connexion between it and its supposed effect. The same difficulty occurs in contemplating the operations of mind on body- where we observe the motion of the latter to follow upon the volition of the former, but are not able to observe or conceive the tie which binds together the motion and volition, or the energy by which the mind produces this effect. The authority of the will over its own faculties and ideas is not a whit more comprehensible: So that, upon the whole, there appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of connexion which is conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seemed conjoined, but never connected. And as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connexion or force at all, and that these words are absolutely without meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life. (Hume, 1737)
David Hume is famous for formalizing the Problem of Causation - that we do not understand 'what exists' nor their 'necessary connexions' thus we do not understand the logical / necessary connection between the objects that exist in the Space around us (Cosmology) and how our mind/language can have knowledge of these objects (Metaphysics).
Hume's Problem of Causation has remained unsolved for 250 years (Neither Kant nor Popper positively solved it!) and this lack of certainty, at the very heart of Human Scientific Knowledge, has greatly prejudiced our belief in the possibility of Metaphysics and the certainty of Science, and has ultimately led to the extreme skepticism (Postmodernism) of our currently troubled and confused times. It is a delight to read David Hume, who writes brilliantly - beautifully blending clarity, content and style. As his skills far exceed my own, I shall gladly limit myself to ordering and presenting his words and ideas, such that I may clearly demonstrate his Problem of Causation (and as a consequence, Induction). Most importantly though, by doing this it becomes possible to show how these profound problems can now, finally, be sensibly solved.
It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely depends.
When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other.
... experience only teaches us, how one event constantly follows another; without instructing us in the secret connexion, which binds them together, and renders them inseparable.
We then call the one object, Cause; the other, Effect. We suppose that there is some connexion between them; some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity.
I say then, that, even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on (a priori) reasoning, or any process of the understanding.
It is allowed on all hands that there is no known connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; and consequently, that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction, by anything which it knows of their nature. (Hume, 1737)
Hume Correctly Explains that Humans do not Know the 'Necessary Connexion' between Objects and thus do not know the relationship between Cause and Effect. This quite simply is the Problem of Causation - that until we know 'what exists' and the 'necessary connexions' between these things that exist, then it is impossible for Humanity to have certainty of knowledge.
This then leads to the further Problem of Induction, for if we do not know the a priori cause of events then we have no Principles from which to logically deduce our conclusions. We are left simply observing that one event follows another and seems connected, but we do not know how or why, thus we must depend upon repeated observation (Induction) to determine the laws of Nature (the current state of Modern Physics) and hence tacitly assuming (without reason) that the future is like the past. (It is simply a habit of thinking to connect two events which seem to occur in conjunction and necessarily assumes that the future will be like the past.)
...all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past. .... Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses.
I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other.
It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue so. (Hume, 1737)
Let us now apply our knowledge of the Metaphysics of Space and Motion and the WSM to this greatest of all Human intellectual problems, Hume's Problem of Causation, which can only be solved by understanding how Matter Exists in this Space of the Universe.
Firstly, Hume agrees that there obviously is a 'necessary connexion' between objects (Matter) in Space. This is obvious by the fact that Physics is able to describe many events with mathematical precision. Thus if we had knowledge of this 'secret connexion' or Force we could accurately predict (logically deduce) the future (from cause to effect) without need of induction from repeated observation and thus having to assume the future is like the past.
It is universally allowed that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a necessary force, and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted from it.
The generality of mankind never find any difficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature - such as the descent of heavy bodies, the growth of plants, the generation of animals, or the nourishment of bodies by food: But suppose that, in all these cases, they perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by which it is connected with its effect, and is for ever infallible in its operation.
From the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect, even without experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it, by mere dint of thought and reasoning.
Now it seems evident that, if this conclusion were formed by reason, it would be as perfect at first, and upon one instance, as after ever so long a course of experience.
This question I propose as much for the sake of information, as with an intention of raising difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine any such reasoning. But I keep my mind still open to instruction, if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it upon me. (Hume, 1737)
The solution to Hume's Problem of Causation is realized by understanding how Matter Exists in Space as a Spherical Standing Wave whose Focal Point creates the 'Particle' Effect of Matter. So now that we know the Two Fundamental Principles of the WSM, we understand the Cause of the 'Particle' Effect, and thus we can logically deduce the Motion of the Focal Point ('Particle'). By simply considering how the Velocity of the Spherical In-Wave changes as it flows in through other matter in the Space around it, we can thus logically determine where those Spherical In-Waves will meet at their Focal Point thus we can determine the future motion of the 'Particle' Effect. So let us re-visit Hume's simple problem of why a stone falls to the Earth;
Would we, therefore, form a just and precise idea of necessity, we must consider whence that idea arises when we apply it to the operation of bodies. ... A stone or piece of metal raised into the air, and left without any support, immediately falls: but to consider the matter a priori, is there anything we discover in this situation which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or any other motion, in the stone of metal? (Hume)
Firstly, we must realize that the stone Exists as many trillions of Spherical (Ellipsoidal) Standing Waves whose Wave-Centers/Focal Points are trapped resonating together in the Space that we call the Matter of the stone. Thus the reason why the stone falls to the Earth is simply because of Principle Two - The Spherical (Ellipsoidal) In-Waves travel more slowly through the higher mass-energy density of Space that we call the matter of Earth than they do in the opposite direction from Space through the Earth's atmosphere. This causes the Focal Point (where the Spherical In-Waves meet at their Wave-Center) to move (accelerate) towards the earth - which we see as the stone falling. Thus as Hume demanded, we have replaced Inductive Logic from repeated observation of Effects with Deductive Logic from the Two Principles of the WSM, which demonstrate the Cause of the 'Particle' Effect.
For the most part, attempts to solve the problem of induction have taken the form of trying to fit inductive arguments into a deductive mould. (Ayer, 1956)
Finally, why does Induction work, why is the future like the past? (And it is obvious that it is else all our Science would be nonsense.)
Without True Knowledge of Reality it is impossible to understand cause and effect - we are simply limited to describing the effects of things upon us, without understanding the cause of these effects. As we did not know how matter interacted with other matter in the Space around it (action-at-a-distance) we consequently did not understood how our human senses were connected to the world of objects in Space around us and thus what caused the perceived effects of our senses.
This lack of knowledge then leads to (what Popper termed) Hume's 'Problem of Induction'. This problem can again be demonstrated using Hume's simple example of dropping a stone such that when I let go of the stone it falls to earth. I can then repeat this experiment any number of times but despite this number of repetitions does this logically (inductively) infer that the stone must fall the next time I let it go. Hume argued that it does not, that it is simply a habit of thinking and that it is quite possible that at some stage in the future the stone will not fall. This leads to the realization that the logic of induction depends upon repeated observation and thus the assumption that the future is like the past.
As Hume explains though;
The supposition that the future resembles the past, is not founded on arguments of any kind, but is derived entirely from habit.
Thus Hume's skepticism is valid and has subsequently plagued Philosophy and the sciences with a terribly destructive doubt and a fertile environment for all kinds of absurdity and mysticism. Ultimately all science depends upon observation of the world for its knowledge, and thus Hume's problem of induction must be solved if we are to have certainty of knowledge. As Ayer explains of the philosophical skeptic;
.. his contention is that any inference from past to future is illegitimate.. that it is to be doubted whether the exercise of sense-perception can in any circumstances whatever afford proof of the existence of physical objects. (Ayer, 1956)
The solution to this profound problem is in two parts and is beautiful in its
i) Once we understand reality, then we understand the cause of the effect. Thus we no longer depend upon repeated observation to inductively deduce that the stone falls when I let it go, for we can now use deductive logic from first principles to deduce that the stone falls to the earth because its In-Waves are travelling more slowly through the Space of the earth.
ii) We can also explain why the future is like the past because the In-Waves () after flowing through the Wave-Center (our present) become the Out-Waves (our past) and thus the future causes the past and must therefore be like the past. This then explains why we can trust inductive reasoning, for its assumption that the future is like the past is valid, and this also then explains why science has been so successful even though it was founded on an inductive logic whose validity until now could not be shown to be true.
Now the skeptic can still argue that while I may have replaced induction with deduction, nonetheless I still depend upon induction, i.e. upon repeated observation of events, to confirm the truth of the deductive theory.
This is true, but I then can justify this use of induction to support deduction, by showing that this wave theory of matter explains why the future is similar to the past, and therefore deduce that induction is valid.
Hume astutely points to the heart of the problem when he writes;
Solidity, Extension, Motion; these qualities are all complete in themselves, and never point out any other event which may result from them. The scenes of the universe are continually shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted succession; but the power of force, which actuates the whole machine, is entirely concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of body. (Hume, 1737)
We can now simply explain these four things, Solidity, Extension, Motion, and Force from the Metaphysics of Space and Motion and the Two Principles of the Wave Structure of Matter (WSM).
Solidity and Extension are Properties of Space. As we have explained earlier, solid objects like rocks exist in Space as a collection of Spherical Standing Waves whose Wave-Centers (Focal-Points) make up the many trillions of 'Particles' that constitute the matter of the rock.
These Wave-Centers become trapped in standing wave arrays (e.g. crystals) and thus take on the nearly rigid properties of Space with their relative motion to one another (e.g. it is hard to squash a rock because you can't push the Wave-Centers closer together with the Wave-Centers of your body - At a certain number of standing waves apart your Wave-Centers become trapped with those on the surface of the rock - because the In and Out Waves pair up with each other). This then prevents the Wave-Centers from moving closer together which we sense as a solid rock in Space.
Motion exists in two different though directly related ways;
i) The Velocity of Wavemotion of the Spherical In and Out Waves (Velocity of Light c)
Which then determines;
ii) The Motion of the Focal Point ('Particle' effect) through Space.
Finally, Force, as we have previously explained, is caused by a change in Velocity of the In-Waves, which then causes a change in the future location of where these In-Waves will meet at their Focal-Point, which we see as the accelerated motion of the 'Particle'. (Thus explaining Newton's Law of Inertia Force = Mass times Acceleration.)
We begin with Kant's Introduction to his Metaphysics, which gives an appropriate grandness to this beautiful and important subject. This will then explain the Metaphysical problems that he faced and his partial solution. (Which was a disturbing solution for Philosophy/Humanity to arrive at, as Kant concluded that we could never understand what we actually are as Humans in the Universe, and which has ultimately resulted in our currently confusing state of Postmodernism).
Following this, I shall explain the two minor errors that Kant made; i) To assume Space, Time and Causation rather than Space and Motion; and ii) To assume that Matter is somehow Atomic ('Particles') thus to incorrectly separate the body and mind from the external world. This then leads us to a simple, sensible, and complete solution for the Metaphysical problem of how we can have direct Knowledge of the External World.
Before starting, let me first add a delightful and important thought from Aristotle, that sums up both how feeble our Minds are (blind to the obvious) and that even philosophical work that is wrong is still very useful, for it may well point out the correct path to those who follow and further explore. (For philosophers must be adventurers and explorers of the intellectual world, which takes a certain courage and determined self belief I think.)
And perhaps its difficulty exists in two ways, not in the things but in us as responsible for them. For just as bats' eyes are towards daylight, so in our soul is the mind towards those things that are clearest of all. And we should not only be grateful to those in whose opinions we share but also to those who have gone astray. For even the latter have contributed something, since they have prepared the condition for us. (Aristotle, Metaphysics)
Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of human reason.
It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to even higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labors must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called metaphysics.
Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honor. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, ...
..her empire gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the reign of anarchy; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time those who had organized themselves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily, small; and thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan.
At present, as all methods, according to the general persuasion,
have been tried in vain, there reigns naught but weariness and complete indifferentism
- the mother of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time
the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation
of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from
We very often hear complaints of the shallowness of the present age, and of the decay of profound science. But I do not think that those which rest upon a secure foundation, such as Mathematics, Physical Science, etc., in the least deserve this reproach, but that they rather maintain their ancient fame, and in the latter case, indeed, far surpass it. The same would be the case with the other kinds of cognition, if their principles were but firmly established. In the absence of this security, indifference, doubt, and finally, severe criticism are rather signs of a habit of thorough thought. Our age is the age of criticism, to which everything must be subjected. The sacredness of religion, and the authority of legislation, are by many regarded as grounds of exemption from the examination of this tribunal. But, if they are exempted, they become the subjects of just suspicion, and cannot lay claim to sincere respect, which reason accords only to that which has stood the test of a free and public examination.
I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the knowledge to which it strives to attain independently of all experience; in other words, the solution of the question regarding the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of principles.
This path - the only one now remaining - has been entered upon by me; and I flatter myself that I have, in this way, discovered the cause of - and consequently the mode of removing - all the errors which have hitherto set reason at variance with itself, in the sphere of non-empirical thought. I have not returned an evasive answer to the questions of reason, by alleging the inability and limitation of the faculties of the mind; I have, on the contrary, examined them completely in the light of principles, and after having discovered the cause of the doubts and contradictions into which reason fell, have solved them to its perfect satisfaction.
It is the duty of philosophy to destroy the illusions which had their origin in misconceptions, whatever darling hopes and valued expectations may be ruined by its explanations. My chief aim in this work has been completeness; and I make bold to say, that there is not a single metaphysical problem that does not find its solution, or at least the key to its solution, here. Pure reason is a perfect unity.
While I say this, I think I see upon the countenance of the reader signs of dissatisfaction mingle with contempt, when he hears declarations which sound so boastful and extravagant; and yet they are beyond comparison more moderate than those advanced by the commonest author of the commonest philosophical programme, in which the dogmatist professes to demonstrate the simple nature of the soul, or the necessity of a first beginning of the world. Such a dogmatist promises to extend human knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience; while I humbly confess that this is completely beyond my power. Instead of any such attempt, I confine myself to the examination of reason alone and its pure thought; and I do not need to seek far to attain complete knowledge of these, because they have their seat in my own mind.
As regards certitude, I have fully convinced myself that, in this sphere of thought, opinion is perfectly inadmissible, and that everything which bears the least semblance of an hypothesis must be excluded, as of no value in such discussions. For it is a necessary condition of all knowledge that is to be established upon a priori grounds, that it shall be held to be absolutely necessary; much more is this the case with an attempt to determine all pure a priori knowledge, and to furnish the standard- and consequently an example- of all apodeictic (philosophical) certitude.
..a mere opinion, and that the reader must therefore be at liberty to hold a different opinion. But I beg to remind him, that, if my subjective deduction does not produce in his mind the conviction of its certitude at which I aimed, the objective deduction, with which alone the present work is properly concerned, is in every respect satisfactory.
For metaphysics has to deal only with principles and with the limitations of its own employment as determined by these principles.
That space and time are only forms of sensible intuition, and hence are only conditions of the existence of things as appearances; that, moreover, we have no concepts of the understanding, and, consequently, no elements for knowing things, except in so far as a corresponding intuition can be given to these concepts; that, accordingly, we can have no knowledge of an object, as a thing in itself, but only as an object of sensible intuition, that is, as appearance- all this is proved in the Analytical part of the Critique; and from this the limitation of all possible speculative knowledge to the mere objects of experience, follows as a necessary result.
For this result, then, we are indebted to a criticism which warns us of our unavoidable ignorance with regard to things in themselves, and establishes the necessary limitation of our theoretical knowledge to mere appearances.
We have intended, then, to say, that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearances; that the things which we intuit are not in themselves the same as our representations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we take away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear; and that these, as appearances, cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us. We know nothing more than our own mode of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which, though not of necessity pertaining to every being, does so to human beings. With this alone we have to do.
Space and time are the pure forms thereof ; sensation the matter. The former alone can we know a priori, that is, antecedent to all actual perception; and for this reason such knowledge is called pure intuition. The latter is that in our knowledge which is called knowledge a posteriori, that is, empirical intuition. The former appertain absolutely and necessarily to our sensibility, of whatsoever kind our sensations may be; the latter may be of very diversified character. Supposing that we should carry our empirical intuition even to the very highest degree of clearness, we should not thereby advance one step nearer to a appearances of the constitution of objects as things in themselves. For we could only, at best, arrive at a complete appearances of our own mode of intuition, that is, of our sensibility, and this always under the conditions originally attaching to the subject, namely, the conditions of space and time; while the question, 'What are objects considered as things in themselves?' remains unanswerable even after the most thorough knowledge of appearances.
..not only are the raindrops mere appearances, but even their circular form, nay, the space itself through which they fall, is nothing in itself, but both are mere modifications or fundamental dispositions of our sensible intuition, whilst the transcendental object remains for us utterly unknown. (End of Kant Summary)
So in a sense Kant gave us a negative solution, for he thought he was explaining
the necessary limitations of our Knowledge. He may well be right given his founding
principles of Space, Time and Causation. His problem is that these foundations
are incorrect. Once we understand the Metaphysics of Space and Motion though,
then we can demonstrate the simple sensible solution to Kant's problem, and
thus provide a positive solution to Metaphysics (for the first time.)
I will begin by briefly explaining some of Kant's language and then show how his language can be applied to solve his own problem
..if we have a proposition which contains the idea of necessity in its very conception, it is a judgement a priori;
..an empirical (a posteriori) judgement never exhibits strict and absolute, but only assumed and comparative universally (by induction); therefore, the most we can say is - so far as we have hitherto observed - there is no exception to this or that rule. If, on the other hand, a judgement carries with it strict and absolute universality, that is, admits of no possible exception, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely a priori.
Necessity and strict universality, therefore, are infallible tests for distinguishing pure (a priori) from empirical (a posteriori) knowledge, and are inseparably connected with each other.
The attempt to think these objects will hereafter furnish an excellent test of the new method of thought which we have adopted, and which is based on the principle that we only know in things a priori that which we ourselves place in them. (Kant, 1781)
In all judgement wherein the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought (I mention affirmative judgements only here; the application to negative will be very easy), this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as somewhat which is contained (though covertly) in concept A; or the predicate B lies completely outside the concept A, although it stands in connection with it. In the first instance, I term the judgement analytical, in the second, synthetical.
The former (Analytic) may be called explicative, the latter (Synthetic) augmentative judgements; because the former add in the predicate nothing to the concept of the subject, but only analyze it into its constituent concepts, which were thought already in the subject, although in a confused manner; the latter add to our concepts of the subject a predicate which was not contained in it, and which no analysis could ever have discovered therein. For example, when I say, 'All bodies are extended,' this is an analytical judgement. For I need not go beyond the concept of body in order to find extension connected with it, but merely analyze the concept, that is, become conscious of the manifold properties which I think in that concept, in order to discover this predicate in it: it is therefore an analytical judgement. On the other hand, when I say, 'All bodies are heavy', the predicate is something totally different from that which I think in the mere concept of a body. By the addition of such a predicate, therefore, it becomes a synthetical judgement. Empirical judgements, as such, are always synthetical. (Kant, 1781)
For whence could our experience itself acquire its certainty, if all the rules on which it depends were themselves empirical, and consequently contingent? No one, therefore, can admit the validity of the use of such rules as first principles. But, for the present, we may content ourselves with having established the fact, that we do possess and exercise a faculty of pure a priori knowledge; and secondly, with having pointed out the proper tests of such knowledge, namely, universality and necessity.
Natural science (physics) contains in itself synthetical judgements a priori, as principles. I shall adduce two propositions. For instance, the proposition, 'In all changes of the material world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged' ; or, that, 'In all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be equal.' In both of these, not only is the necessity, and therefore their origin a priori clear, but also that they are synthetical propositions. For in the concept of matter, I do not think its permanency, but merely its presence in space, which it fills. I therefore really go out of and beyond the concepts of matter, in order to think on to it something a priori, which I did not think in it. The proposition is therefore not analytical, but synthetical, and nevertheless conceived a priori; and so it is with regard to the other propositions of the pure part of natural science.
As to metaphysicians, even if we look upon it merely as an attempted science, yet, from the nature of human reason, an indispensable one, we find that it must contain synthetical a priori knowledge. It is not merely the duty of metaphysics to dissect, and thereby analytically to illustrate the concepts which we form a priori of things; but we seek to widen the range of our a priori knowledge. For this purpose, we must avail ourselves of such principles as add something to the original concept- something not identical with, nor contained in it, and by means of synthetical judgements a priori, leave behind us the limits of experience; for example, in the proposition, 'the world must have a beginning,' and such like. Thus metaphysics, at least in its intention, consists merely of synthetical propositions a priori.
That metaphysics has hitherto remained in so vacillating a state of uncertainty and contradiction, is only to be attributed to the fact, that this great problem, and perhaps even the difference between analytical and synthetical judgements, did not sooner suggest itself to philosophers. Upon the solution of this problem, or upon sufficient proof of the impossibility of synthetical knowledge a priori, depends the existence or downfall of metaphysics.
What Kant writes here is fundamentally important to Metaphysics and thus to all Human Knowledge. So now it is time to explain the solution.
Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outward experiences. For, in order that certain sensations may relate to something outside me (that is, to something which occupies a different part of space from that in which I am); in like manner, in order that I may represent them not merely as outside of and next to each other, but also in separate places, the representation of space cannot be borrowed from the relations of external phenomena through experience; but, on the contrary, this external experience is itself only possible through the said antecedent representation.
Space then is a necessary representation a priori, which serves for the foundation of all external intuitions. We never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space, though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it. It must, therefore, be considered as the condition of the possibility of appearances, and by no means as a determination dependent on them, and is a representation a priori, which necessarily supplies the basis for external appearances.
Moreover, these parts cannot antecede this one all-embracing space, as the component parts from which the aggregate can be made up, but can be thought only as existing in it. Space is essentially one, and multiplicity in it; consequently the general concept of spaces depends solely upon limitations. Hence it follows that an a priori intuition (which is not empirical) lies at the root of all our concepts of space.
Space is represented as an infinite given quantity. Now every
concept must indeed be considered as a representation which is contained in
an infinite multitude of different possible representations (as their common
characteristic), which therefore, comprises these under itself; but no concept,
as such, can be so conceived, as if it contained within itself an infinite multitude
of representations. Nevertheless, space is so conceived, for all parts of space,
even to infinity, exist at once. Consequently, the original representation of
space is an intuition a priori, and not a concept.
.. space contains all which can appear to us externally.
Kant is correct that the concept of Time is a priori, that it is necessary for being able to sense things. He is also correct that Time only exists as an 'intuition' of our Mind, and not as a thing in itself.
Kant's error was to not realize that Time is Caused by the Wave Motion of Space, and that it is actually Motion (not Time) that is necessary for us to sense things. We can easily understand this by simply imagining that matter in Space could not Move - then we could neither think, nor sense anything - the world would be 'frozen' and stationary, and there would be no time or change. Thus we realize the fundamental a priori nature of Motion, that the Wave-Motion of Space does actually exist and is a priori necessary for us to sense things.
Time is not an empirical concept. For neither co-existence nor succession would be perceived by us, if the representation of time did not exist as a foundation a priori.
Time is a necessary representation, lying at the foundation of all our intuitions. With regard to appearances in general, we cannot think away time from them, and represent them to ourselves as out of and unconnected with time.
Here I shall add that the concept of change, and with it the concept of motion, as change of place, is possible only through and in the representation of time.
.. our concept of time explains the possibility of so much synthetical knowledge a priori, as is exhibited in the general doctrine of motion, which is not a little fruitful.
All things, as appearances, that is, objects of sensible intuition are in time', then the proposition has its sound objective validity and universality a priori.
What we have now then set forth teaches, therefore, the empirical reality of time; that is, its objective validity in reference to all objects which can ever be presented to our senses. And as our intuition is always sensible, no object ever can be presented to us in experience, which does not come under the conditions of time. On the other hand, we deny to time all claim to absolute reality; that is, we deny that it, without regard to the form of our sensible intuition, absolutely inheres in things in themselves, never can be presented to us through the medium of the senses. Herein consists, therefore, the transcendental ideality of time, according to which, if we abstract the subjective conditions of sensible intuition, it is nothing, and cannot be reckoned as subsisting or inhering in objects as things in themselves, independently of its relation to our intuition.
But absolute reality.. cannot be granted it. Time is nothing but the form of our internal intuition. If we take away from it the special condition of our sensibility, the concept of time also vanishes; and it inheres not in the objects themselves, but solely in the subject which intuits them.
..the transcendental concept of appearances in space is a critical admonition, that, in general, nothing which is intuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not a form which belongs as a property to things; but that objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not known by means of these representations, nor ever can be, but respecting which, in experience, no inquiry is ever made.
This is wrong, for we now know that Matter/Objects are not 'Particles' somehow separate from Space, but that Matter is Spherically Spatially extended as a Structure of Space, (a Spherical Standing Wave Structure to be precise). Thus it is no longer possible to talk of Matter separate from Space (or Time/Motion as both Einstein's Relativity and the Metaphysics of Space and Motion have amply demonstrated).
On the contrary, if we ascribe objective reality to these forms of representation, it becomes impossible to avoid changing everything into mere illusory appearance. For if we regard space and time as properties, which must be found in objects as things in themselves, if they are to be possible at all, and reflect on the absurdities in which we then find ourselves involved, inasmuch as we are compelled to admit the existence of two infinite things, which are nevertheless not substances, nor anything really inhering in substances, nay, to admit that they are the necessary conditions of the existence of all things, and moreover, that they must continue to exist, although all existing things were annihilated - we cannot blame the good Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere illusory appearances. Nay, even our own existence, which would in this case depend upon the self-existent reality of such a mere nonentity as time, would necessarily be changed with it into mere illusory appearance- an absurdity which no one has yet been guilty of.
On the other hand, those who maintain the absolute reality of time and space, whether as essentially subsisting, or only inhering, as modifications, in things, must find themselves at utter variance with the principles of experience itself. For, if they decide for the first view, and make space and time into substances, this being the side taken by mathematical natural philosophers, they must admit two self-subsisting nonentities, infinite and eternal, which exist (yet without there being anything real) for the purpose of containing in themselves everything that is real.
Again, the solution is simple, if we reject Time as an independent existent, both Space and Motion (as we have earlier explained) are Infinite and Eternal (and real), i.e. we can clearly understand how both Space and the Wave-Motion of Space can exist, side by side, as Infinite and Eternal things.
Please read the following quotes from Kant carefully;
I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects, so far as this mode of knowledge is possible a priori.
Time and space are, therefore, two sources of knowledge, from which, a priori, various synthetical knowledge can be drawn.
Not only in judgements, however, but even in concepts, is an a priori origin manifest. For example, if we take away by degrees from our empirical concepts of a body all that can be referred to experience - color, hardness or softness, weight, even impenetrability- the body will then vanish; but the space which it occupied still remains, and this it is utterly impossible to annihilate in thought.
The attempt to think these objects will hereafter furnish an excellent test of the new method of thought which we have adopted, and which is based on the principle that we only know in things a priori that which we ourselves place in them.
For the analysis, that is, mere dissection of concepts, contained in this or that, is not the aim of, but only a preparation for metaphysics proper, which has for its object the extension, by means of synthesis, of our a priori knowledge. And for this purpose, mere analysis is of course useless, because it only shows what is contained in these concepts, but not how we arrive, a priori, at them; and this it is its duty to show, in order to be able afterwards to determine their valid use in regard to all objects of experience, to all knowledge in general.
Thus Kant is saying (correctly);
i) That all things ultimately must exist in Space, which is thus a priori (as it is first necessary for Space to exist before we can sense (empirical / a posteriori) objects in Space)
ii) We only know in things a priori that which we ourselves place in them. That metaphysics proper, has for its object the extension, by means of synthesis, of our a priori knowledge.
I absolutely agree with Kant!
His error is to say ..there are two pure forms of sensible intuition, as principles of knowledge a priori, namely space and time.
This is wrong, the 'two pure forms of sensible intuition, as principles of knowledge a priori, are namely Space and Motion' and that we must place in this a priori concept of Space the correct meaning - that Space is a Wave-Medium and thus contains within it a second thing, Wave Motion (and we do this using the Two Principles of the WSM).
And now, finally we come to the heart of Kant's problem, which is clear from this following VERY important quote;
..even that of motion, which unites in itself both elements (Space and Time), presuppose something empirical. Motion, for example, presupposes the perception of something movable. But space considered in itself contains nothing movable; consequently motion must be something which is found in space only through experience - in other words, is an empirical datum.
And this error then leads Kant to conclude that;
..in respect to the form of appearances, much may be said a priori, whilst of the thing in itself, which may lie at the foundation of these appearances, it is impossible to say anything.
As I have explained though, once we solve Kant's misunderstanding of Time and Motion, then we can create a new Metaphysics at this most fundamental level of Reality, that Space Exists as a Wave-Medium and Matter Exists as a Spherical Standing Wave-Motion of Space, and thus with this new synthesis of a priori meaning added to the concept of Space we then find that the previous errors and contradictions (paradoxes) simply disappear. Now this is a profound solution, for this error in understanding Space and Time has continued for the past two hundred and has detrimentally influence such great minds as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Mach, and Einstein, and has thus ultimately led to our current postmodern confusion.
The following quote from Nietzsche clearly demonstrates how this error of Kant's has continually manifested in the minds of our past philosophers;
Intuitive representation, however, embraces two things: firstly, the present, motley, changing world, pressing on us in all experiences; secondly, the conditions by means of which alone any experience of this world becomes possible: time and space. For these are able to be intuitively apprehended, purely in themselves and independent of any experience, i.e., they can be perceived, although they are without definite contents. (Nietzsche, 1890)
As we have explained, Kant regarded Space and Time as being a priori (i.e. Universal and not from our senses, but necessary for us to have senses). Most significantly though, Kant argues, incorrectly, that both: Space and Time; AND our Senses existed as ideas in our mind, and did not directly correspond to the 'real world';
... if we take away the subject (Humans), or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear; and that these, as appearances, cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us. .... not only are the raindrops mere appearances, but even their circular (spherical) form, nay, the space itself through which they fall (motion), is nothing in itself, but both are mere modifications or fundamental dispositions of our sensible intuition, whilst the transcendental object remains for us utterly unknown.
Let us then briefly consider this concept of 'Reality' for it can be taken in two important ways:
Kant's Idealism (Mind Represented) Reality; or as Direct Material Realism of the Metaphysics of Space and Motion.
Kant argues that Space Time (and the Causal Motion of Matter in Space) are our constructions of our own mind. Kant still agrees that there is a physical reality, but it is always separate from our ideas and senses of it.
Hence this determination of my existence, and consequently my internal experience itself, must depend on something permanent which is not in me, which can be, therefore, only in something external to me, to which I must look upon myself as being related. Thus the reality of the external sense is necessarily connected with that of the internal, in order to the possibility of experience in general; that is, I am just as certainly conscious that there are things external to me related to my sense, as I am that I myself exist, as determined in time.
Thus Kant's problem, which he cannot solve, is that he does not know 'what exists' thus he does not know how we are 'necessarily connected' to Matter in the Space around us, as we must be (and Kant acknowledges this) if we are to be able to sense these 'external' objects. Thus as is common in Philosophy, Kant had to finally admit defeat and depend upon the concept of 'God' to explain these 'necessary connections'. He argues;
For as conditions of all existence in general, Space and Time must be conditions for the existence of God also. But if we do not thus make them objective forms of all things, there is no other way left than to make them subjective forms of our mode of intuition - external and internal - which is called sensible, because it is not primitive, that is, is not such as gives in itself the existence of the object of the intuition (a mode of intuition which, so far as we can judge, can belong only to the prime being), but is dependent on the existence of the object, and is possible, therefore, only on condition that the representative faculty of the subject is affected by the object.
Firstly, you can read this treatise and determine for yourselves - does this language of Matter existing as Spherical Standing Waves in Space logically deduce what we sense in the Motion of Matter in the Space around us. I can answer as a Philosopher and Scientist that it explains most things perfectly (but that there are still many things to explain - similar to how I view Darwinian Evolution, but with more precise mathematical logic to support it, and it explains more things with less things, and all from One fundamental thing, Space!)
But at this stage we are still purely idealistic, for I agree with Kant, both our senses and our logical language exist in the mind.
I should add here though, that even if we were simply limited to Kant's Idealism, nonetheless, the discovery of the correct language for describing reality (even if it was limited to within our mind) would be a remarkable and profound human achievement, and would in itself radically change our world view (for as we will shortly see, Postmodern Philosophy now no longer even believes that this is possible!)
But let us take the further step of Direct Material Realism, and ask;
'Does this Language of Spherical Standing Waves in Space merely exist in our mind, and Reality is something separate that we represent with our mind, or does this Language of Spherical Standing Waves in Space actually describe what physically exists, not as a representation but as a direct description?'
The logic is now overwhelming that Space does actually exist and is spherically vibrating. It now seems certain to me that I exist in this Space as a Structure of many trillions of Wave-Centers all trapped in complex interconnected 'orbits/oscillating wave functions' about one another that have evolved my enormous complexity. This is sensible and logical to me for the following reasons, to which I think we must all agree;
1. Something must exist
2. The human mind and ideas require human bodies and brains to exist.
3. There must be some necessary connection (and MOTION) between the matter of our brain and body and other matter in the universe (for us to be able to see it, move it around.)
4. That our Representation of Reality is not direct from our senses, but is constructed by the mind (and this is limited to sensing only a tiny fraction of 'What Exists' .
So for example we only see a half moon (we are deceived for it is still a whole moon) because we only sense a tiny 'visible' frequency of light (resonant coupling) compared with the many other possible frequencies that our technology uses. (Thus an Infra-red telescope would still see the whole moon)
Significantly, the Metaphysics of Space and Motion and the Wave Structure of Matter (WSM) agrees with each of these four points (which cannot be explained by Kant). Our mind definitely 'represents' the world, a red apple is not really a red apple, it is a structure of many trillions of Spherical Standing Waves the size of the universe, whose Wave-Centers have evolved into this complex structure that has electrons/Wave-Centers trapped in particular frequency 'orbits'. These bound oscillating electrons resonantly couple with electrons in my eye due to oscillating interactions of the apple's In and Out Waves with mine. This particular frequency is represented to my mind as red.
Now while I cannot explain this representation (and this opens up a whole new field of inquiry into this aspect of the mind from the foundations of the WSM) I can explain the Cause of this Representation.
This is important, and I would like you to seriously consider this, for me to BE ABLE TO represent this apple, requires points 1 to 3 above - which is explained quite perfectly with the Metaphysics of Space and Motion and the Wave Structure of Matter.
Thus we see that the Metaphysic of Space and Motion agrees that our mind represents the real world of which we have limited senses.
But what I stress, is that neither Space, nor (Wave) Motion are Representations, but are in fact What Exists such that we can exist and have a mind that 'represents' these Spherical Standing Wave Motions in Space. The Motion of Matter in Space is a True Representation if you like, and there are no reasons why we cannot represent some things truly, e.g. an apple falling (moving) to the ground, is correctly perceived. On the other hand, the half moon is not. By understanding the Metaphysics of Space and Motion though, and thus by understanding 'What Exists', this enables us to determine what is truly represented, and what is not. (Logic fills in the gaps due to our limited senses and our mind's at times incorrect representation of things.)
Note 1: Einstein was similar to Kant in that he founded his work on the Metaphysics of Space and Time, and he explained Causation with the use of force fields. Thus Einstein mathematically represented matter as a changing (in time) spherical field (both force and ellipsoidal shape change) with Motion and near other Matter in Space. Einstein believed in a rigid fundamental Space (the Spherical shape of matter gives Space its three dimensions) and that matter was a structure of Space. He was correct other than he used the wrong language (of spherical electromagnetic force fields) rather than Spherical Standing Waves (SSWs) in Space. As this Treatise explains, the Wave-Center of the SSWs obviously creates the pointlike / 'Particle' effect of matter, and once you understand the theory you will realize that a change in velocity of the Spherical In-Waves, as they interact with other wave structures, causes the resultant acceleration of the 'Particle'/Wave-Center. This, most profoundly, explains Newton's Fundamental Law of Inertia F=m.a and thus explains the 'Necessary Connexion' between 'What Exists' .
This is the fundamental cause of the force field which misled Einstein. And as you shall see, then solves all his problems, unites Relativity with Quantum Theory (as the WSM clearly explains the Particle/wave duality of Q.T.) Further, Wolff's WSM deduces both the de Broglie Wavelength of Quantum Theory and Einstein's Relativistic Mass increase, both are phenomena of relative MOTION. BOTH deduced from the ONE wave equation - absolutely remarkable to do this if this language were not true. Further, the same logic applied to Cosmology solves ALL their major problems also - absolutely remarkable.
Note 2: On Mind Independent Reality - Before humans existed, there still existed reality. Thus in this sense, mind independent reality exists. Space has always existed and been spherically vibrating - this is completely reasonable and logical. For example, it is true that prior to human existence the Earth still orbited the Sun, and for this to occur requires two things, Space and Motion! Thus Space and Motion exist independently of our Minds and are NOT merely representations of our Minds!
On Mind Independent from Reality - The mind must exist as a structure of Reality (the relative motions of trillions of Wave-centers, both internal and external to the body) thus the mind depends upon Reality for its existence, i.e. there can be no Mind separate / independent from Reality.
Metaphysics can be simplified into two fundamental questions that separate
various Schools of Philosophy.
1. Is it possible to construct a human logical language that corresponds to our senses? (Deduces exactly what we observe.)
2. Is it possible to construct a human logical language that directly corresponds to 'what exists' and explains the cause of our senses?
Kant answers YES to 1 and NO to 2.
Postmodernism answers NO to both (there are no absolute truths, only evolving approximations!)
The Metaphysics of Space and Motion answers YES to both.
By describing Reality from the foundations Spherical Standing Waves in Space we thus define the meaning of the words used and how they are necessarily connected to the physical reality of Space. (Using Kant's concept of Synthetic a priori knowledge to construct new meaning for the word Space (it is a Wave-Medium) and Matter (it is a Spherical Standing Wave (SSW) in Space).
Most significantly, we can then demonstrate that this language logically deduces exactly we what sense in this Space around us, that it necessarily/logically connects our language to the real world of the Motion of Objects (SSWs) in Space.
..the historian of science may be tempted to exclaim that when paradigms change, the world itself changes with them. (T.S. Kuhn, 1962)
The philosophers have merely interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it. (Karl Marx)
In my opinion, the greatest scandal of philosophy is that, while
all around us the world of nature perishes - and not the world of nature alone
- philosophers continue to talk, sometimes cleverly and sometimes not, about
the question of whether this world exists. They get involved in scholasticism,
in linguistic puzzles such as, for example, whether or not there are differences
between 'being' and 'existing'.'
'But should there exist something like the correspondence of a theory to the facts, then this would obviously be more important than mere self-consistency, and certainly also more important than coherence with any earlier 'knowledge' (or 'belief'); for if a theory corresponds to the facts but does not cohere with some earlier knowledge, then this earlier knowledge should be discarded. (Popper, 1975)
In 1940, two hundred years after Hume first formalized the Metaphysical Problem of Causation, Einstein (frustratingly) confirms that the problem remained unsolved;
For the time being we have to admit that we do not possess any general theoretical basis for physics which can be regarded as its logical foundation. (Einstein, 1940)
This failure (with the recent exception of Wolff) has continued to the present day, and it is only natural human behavior (psychological) that this has resulted in our current Postmodern belief that it is impossible to directly describe and understand the reality of what exists.
Over much of the philosophical world in this century the doctrine of the impossibility of metaphysics became almost an orthodoxy, and the adjective 'metaphysical' a pejorative word. Some of the reasons for this devaluation should now be clear. The conceptual distortions and final incoherence of systems, the abstract myths parading as Reality, the grandiose claims and the conflicting results - these seemed to many the essence of the metaphysical enterprise and sufficient reason for condemning it.
Having the avowed aim of arriving at profound truths about everything, it is sometimes held to result only in obscure nonsense about nothing. (Brown, Twentieth Century Philosophers, 1998)
Thus our lack of understanding of the Reality of 'what exists' has finally left us with a confused, contradictory, and uncertain Postmodern view that the solution is impossible as Feyerabend mockingly exclaims;
The only absolute truth is that there are NO ABSOLUTE TRUTHS.
This uncertainty also affected Popper who is famous for his Postmodern Metaphysic
that all Truth is approximate and evolving, no absolute truth is possible.
I find some philosophy frustrating because of its many abstract concepts and creative ideas without empirical foundations nor support, that it is difficult to follow and understand, and that it leads to all sorts of problems and paradoxes. On the other hand, when I read minds like Aristotle's it feels like the sun is shining down on me, there is this illuminating intelligence and elegance to their simple ideas. Thus it please me greatly to be able to respond to a 'philosopher' such as Feyerabend with the immortal words of one of humanity's most brilliant and lucid minds, Aristotle;
Finally, if nothing can be truly asserted, even the following
claim would be false, the claim that there is no true assertion. And if there
is a true assertion, this is a refutation of what is pretended by the raisers
of these objections, being as they are the comprehensive eliminators of all
Indeed these arguments themselves fall victim to the very difficulty about which their defenders are always canting. They effectively destroy themselves. For if anyone says that all things are true then he is making even the negation of his own claim true, so that his own statement in turn is not true (that is, after all, what its negation asserts), while if anyone says that all things are false, then he is making his own claim to be false. (Aristotle, Metaphysics)
Now Hume was also exceedingly sharp and smart, and he predicts that failure to understand and solve his Problem of Causation, and thus to understand the 'necessary connexion' between 'what exists', would inevitable lead to the end of rational science;
Shall we then establish it for a general maxim that no refined or elaborate reasoning is ever to be received? By this means you cut off all science and philosophy. (Hume, 1737)
And in a sense this is what has happened, with extremely detrimental consequences to Humanity. Thus the Metaphysics of Space and Motion is a remedy to our Postmodern ailments, for its Absolute Truth shall, in time, lead to the end of Postmodernism and the rise of Realism.
So let us now turn to the work of Popper, and then Kuhn, such that I may continue to justify such bold claims!
I see the views of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn as very similar, (that truth is evolving and can never be absolutely known) and consequently, I find these fine philosophers both very good and very bad for the evolution of Human Knowledge.
Allow me to briefly explain, as this will then solve the last major problem for Metaphysics, the problems of Postmodernism and their rejection of the possibility of Absolute Truth.
My thesis is that realism is neither demonstrable nor refutable. Realism like anything else outside logic and finite arithmetic is not demonstrable; but while empirical scientific theories are refutable, realism is not even refutable. (It shares this irrefutability with many philosophical or 'metaphysical' theories, in particular also with idealism.) But it is arguable, and the weight of the arguments is overwhelmingly in its favor. (Popper, 1975)
Popper followed in Kant's footsteps and thus incorrectly believed that there was no synthetic a priori (that leads to logic) knowledge deducible from Space and Time. The Metaphysics of Space and Motion solves this problem, thus Realism is now Demonstrable from the Two Principles of the Wave Structure of Matter WSM. (Which makes the weight of arguments for Realism even more overwhelmingly in its favor!)
I completely agree with Karl Popper that;
Denying realism amounts to megalomania (the most widespread occupational disease of the professional philosopher). (Popper, 1975)
A piece of knowledge is never false or true - but only more or less biologically and evolutionary useful. All dogmatic creeds are approximations: these approximations form a humus from which better approximations grow. (Mach)
Ernst Mach was a profound logical positivist who was also very influential, as his ideas greatly influenced Einstein, and thus all of twentieth century Physics and Philosophy (including of course, Popper and Kuhn).
Certainly Mach's Principle (that the mass of Matter is determined by all other Matter in the Universe - See Cosmology) is one of the most profound and important principles discovered by Humanity. Nonetheless, Mach's logical positivist views are insidious, and in part have contributed (with Kant) to the current confusions that now abound in Postmodern philosophy.
Let us now analyze some of Popper's arguments upon this important subject, for this will demonstrate how weak their arguments actually are (I mean this purely as a philosopher, I do not wish to sound critical or disrespectful).
Even if we assume that we have been successful - that our physical theories are true - we can learn from our cosmology how infinitely improbable this success is: our theories tell us that the world is almost completely empty, and that empty space is filled with chaotic radiation. And almost all places which are not empty are occupied either by chaotic dust, or by gases, or by very hot stars- all these in conditions which seem to make the application of any method of acquiring physical knowledge logically impossible.
To sum up, there are many worlds, possible and actual worlds, in which a search for knowledge and for regularities would fail. And even in the world as we actually know it from the sciences, the occurrence of conditions under which life, and a search for knowledge , could arise - and succeed- seems to be almost infinitely improbable. Moreover, it seems that if ever such conditions should appear, they would be bound to disappear again, after a time which, cosmologically speaking, is very short. (Popper, 1975)
This argument is way to atomic in its view, and completely ignores Mach's Principle (and modern observation) that all matter is both similar, and intimately interconnected throughout the Universe.
All we can do is to search for the falsity content of our best theory. We do so by trying to refute our theory; that is, by trying to test it severely in the light of all our objective knowledge and all our ingenuity. It is, of course, always possible that the theory may be false even if it passes all these tests; that is allowed for by our search for verisimilitude. But if it passes all these tests then we may have good reason to conjecture that our theory, which (we know) has a greater truth content than its predecessor, may have no greater falsity content. And if we fail to refute the new theory, especially in fields in which its predecessor has been refuted, then we can claim this as one of the objective reasons for the conjecture that the new theory is a better approximation to truth than the old theory. (Popper, 1975)
What is interesting here is the tacit assumption that no theory will ever explain all things, but there is no real reason for this assumption (other than that history showed that no theory had yet explained all things).
Newton's Mechanics was thought to be true for two hundred years, and was then 'consumed' by Einstein's Relativity, which showed that Newton's theory is only approximately true. Both Popper and Kuhn use this argument to justify the assumption that truth must always be evolving and can never be absolutely true. I wish to briefly explain why this is a staggeringly silly and naive argument. I shall begin with their respective comments, and then shall explain their error.
..we must regard all laws or theories as hypothetical or conjectural; that is, as guesses. .. I first turned against it (absolute truth) because of Einstein's theory of gravity: there never was a theory as well 'established' as Newton's, and it is unlikely that there ever will be one; but whether one may think about the status of Einstein's theory, it certainly taught us to look at Newton's as a 'mere' hypothesis or conjecture. (Popper)
The best-known and strongest case for this restricted conception of a scientific theory emerges in discussions of the relation between contemporary Einsteinian dynamics and the older dynamical equations that descend from Newton's Principia. From the viewpoint of this essay these two theories are fundamentally incompatible in the sense illustrated by the relation of Copernican to Ptolemaic astronomy: Einstein's theory can be accepted only with the recognition that Newton's was wrong. (Kuhn, 1962)
Relativity's success in displacing Newtonian theory shows how hazardous it is to claim a priori status for concepts in physics, and how easy it is to mistake a long-lived theory for the final truth. (Urmson, Western Philosophy and Philosophers, 1991)
Now both Newton and Einstein were well aware that Newton's Mechanics was not a complete theory. As the following quote (from a letter Newton sent to Bentley) shows, Newton was well aware of the limitations of his 'Particle' theory for Matter and its dependence upon instant action-at-a-distance.
It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not material operate on and affect other matter without mutual contact .... That gravity should be innate, inherent and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance, through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else by and through which their action may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man, who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it.
So far I have explained the phenomena.. by the force of gravity, but I have not yet ascertained the cause of gravity itself.. and I do not arbitrarily invent hypotheses. (Newton. Letter to Richard Bentley 25 Feb. 1693)
Newton's fundamental principles were so satisfactory from the logical (mathematical) point of view that the impetus to overhaul them could only spring from the demands of empirical fact. Before I go into this I must emphasize that Newton himself was better aware of the weaknesses inherent in his intellectual edifice than the generation of learned scientists which followed him.' (Einstein, 1927)
Both Popper and Kuhn were well aware of these limitations in Newton's Theory thus it is to be expected that more complete theories would be found one day. So really this is an argument for the fact that Metaphysical knowledge was still incomplete, not that truth is always evolving, which is a further unjustified assumption.
Kuhn sums it up rather well when he writes;
Must a theory of motion explain the cause of the attractive forces between particles of matter or may it simply note the existence of such forces? Newton's dynamics was widely rejected because, unlike both Aristotle's and Descartes' theories, it implied the latter answer to the question. When Newton's theory had been accepted, a question was therefore banished from science. (Kuhn, 1962)
And this is so very true and important, mathematicians started to use the logical power and 'necessary connection' of mathematical theories (of forces) and forgot that there must still be something which exists that necessarily connects and causes these forces. As I have explained, the Metaphysics of Space and Motion and the Two Principles of the Wave Structure of Matter finally solves this perplexing problem of how matter exists and exerts forces on other matter in the Space around them. (All forces are in fact caused by a change in Velocity of the In-Waves which causes a change in Motion (acceleration) of the Wave-Center ('Particle').
Their authors do not take Hume's logical criticism sufficiently seriously; and they never seriously consider the possibility that we can, and must, do without induction by repetition, and that we actually manage without it. It seems to me that all the objections to my theory which I know of approach it with the question of whether my theory has solved the traditional problem of induction - that is, whether I have justified inductive inference. Of course I have not. From this my critics deduce that I have failed to solve Hume's problem of induction.
'Hume's problem of Induction' is: How can it be shown that inductive inferences (at least probabilistic ones) are valid, or can be valid?
This problem is a typical muddle since it uncritically pre-supposes the existence of a positive solution to what I have called 'Hume's problem' ; but Hume has proved that no positive solution exists. (Popper, 1975)
As I have explained, Hume DID NOT prove that no positive solution (of Causation and Necessary Connection) is possible, but simply that no positive solution existed, and that Hume kept an open mind as to whether this could indeed be solved (as it now has been with the Metaphysics of Space and Motion).
Of course, I have not solved the problem of how such interaction takes place; and indeed I suspect that this problem is insoluble - not only for interaction between mental and physical states, but more generally. For while, for example, we know that electrical charges repel one another, we have no 'ultimate explanation' of how they do it, even if we accept Maxwell's theory. We do not have any general theory of causality (at any rate not since the breakdown of Descartes' theory that all causality is push). (Popper, 1975)
In fact the Two Principles of the Wave Structure of Matter explain both Charge and Mass as properties of the Wave-Center due to the interactions (and change in velocity) of its In and Out-Waves with other Matter in the Space around them.
Kant pointed out that, with his empiricist dogmatism, Hume had not considered the possibility that there was a principle of causality which was valid a priori. (Popper, 1975)
This is absolutely correct, and is found in the Two Principles of the Wave Structure of Matter.
In fact Popper actually admits that it may be possible to have a metaphysical language which correctly describes (deduces) Reality, and that if this were the case then it would replace his negative/skeptical solution of Hume Problem of induction with a positive solution to Hume's Problem of Causation and Necessary Connection.
There could easily be a little quarrel about the question which is the deeper problem; Hume's Problem of Causation, or what I have called the problem of Induction.
One could argue that if the problem of causation were positively solved - if we could show the existence of a necessary link between cause and effect - the problem of induction would also be solved, and positively. Thus one might say, the problem of causation is the deeper problem.
I argue the other way round: the problem of induction is negatively solved; we can never justify the truth of a belief in a regularity. But we constantly use regularities, as conjectures, as hypotheses; and we have good reasons sometimes for preferring certain conjectures to some of their competitors.'
It is through the falsification of our suppositions that we actually get in touch with 'reality'. It is the discovery and elimination of our errors which alone constitute that 'positive' experience which we gain from reality. (Popper, 1975)
Thus Popper's negative solution to the problem of induction is correct while we do not know the necessary connection between things (e.g. cause and effect) and conversely, Popper's problem of induction is solved once we solve Hume's Metaphysical problem of Causation and hence understand the 'necessary connexions' between 'what exists' in Space.
It has been the case for centuries that new theories have been developed which explain more things with less assumptions, and thus help to remove some of the earlier paradoxes and the proliferation of ad hoc solutions to emerging problems. As Kuhn remarks;
Copernicus complained that in his day astronomers were so 'inconsistent in these [astronomical] investigations.. that they cannot even explain or observe the constant length of the seasonal year.' 'With them,' he continued, 'it is as though an artist were to gather the hands, feet, head and other members for his images from diverse models, each part excellently drawn, but not related to a single body, and since they in no way match each other, the result would be monster rather than man.' Einstein, restricted by current usage to less florid language, wrote only, 'It was as if the ground had been pulled out from under one, with no firm foundation to be seen anywhere, upon which one could have built.' And Wolfgang Pauli, in the months before Heisenberg's paper on matrix mechanics pointed the way to a new quantum theory, wrote to a friend, 'At the moment physics is again terribly confused. In any case, it is too difficult for me, and I wish I had been a movie comedian or something of the sort and had never heard of physics.
All crises begin with the blurring of a paradigm and the consequent loosening of the rules for normal research. .. Or finally, the case that will most concern us here, a crisis may end with the emergence of a new candidate for paradigm and with the ensuing battle over its acceptance. (Kuhn, 1962)
I find it sad to think that we must fight over the Truth. Thus I hope that those who read this, and find that this Metaphysics of Space and Motion is contrary to their existing beliefs, will rise above their emotional instincts to fight for what they believe in, and rather will fight for the truth. The truth is what matters...
It is, I think, particularly in periods of acknowledged crisis that scientists have turned to philosophical analysis as a device for unlocking the riddles of their field. Scientists have not generally needed or wanted to be philosophers.
Almost always the men who achieve these fundamental inventions of a new paradigm have been either very young or very new to the field whose paradigm they change. (Kuhn, 1962)
Thomas Kuhn describes exactly what I am like (a non-academic philosopher who at the age of 35 (I am now 41) returned anew to the task of studying Physics and Philosophy). But this just demonstrates a profound truth about the limitations of academic education, which necessarily infects students with the popular beliefs of their time.
... the puzzles that constitute normal science exist only because no paradigm that provides a basis for scientific research ever completely resolves all its problems.
..each paradigm will be shown to satisfy more or less the criteria that it dictates for itself and to fall short of a few of those dictated by its opponent. .. no paradigm ever solves all the problems it defines.. (Kuhn, 1962)
Now a paradigm is just a common belief in a theory and its principles, and Kuhn was correct when he wrote his book that the principles of reality were not known and thus this incomplete knowledge always left puzzles. His error is to tacitly assume (without evidence) that this absolute knowledge of reality can never be found and that there will always be puzzles;
..the historian of science may be tempted to exclaim that when paradigms change, the world itself changes with them. Led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments and look in new places. Even more important, during revolutions scientists see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before. It is rather as if the professional community had been suddenly transported to another planet where familiar objects are seen in a different light and are joined by unfamiliar ones as well. (Kuhn, 1962)
Kuhn is absolutely correct, and this is why Humanity stands upon the brink of a profound new revolution in Human Knowledge. For once 'Normal Science' becomes aware of the Metaphysics of Space and Motion and the Wave Structure of Matter, then they will very quickly discover, with their new way of seeing things, that it explains and solves their problems very simply and elegantly.
As we have seen, the current Postmodern belief is that the discovery of Reality
is impossible. This extreme skepticism, of which Popper and Kuhn are particularly
famous, assumes that;
a) All truth is limited, approximate, and is constantly evolving
b) No theory can ever be proved true (we can only show that a theory is false)
c) No theory can ever explain all things
d) Thus absolute and certain truth that explains all things is unobtainable.
As Taborsky writes of Postmodern philosophy;
.. the Mediated concept of Truth, is that it first admits that there is no such thing as absolute, pure Truth. There is a reality, which may be abstract or sensual.. but one cannot access it/know it ..'in-itself'. One can only 'know' it within the socially constructed (or species-constructed) 'mediative-habits' of one's particular society/species/whatever.
This error in Postmodern thinking, that our language is too imprecise and relative in meaning to ever absolutely describe Reality, has been caused by the failure of Physicists and Philosophers (over many centuries) to discover Reality. This failure has resulted in the belief that absolute and ultimate True Knowledge of Reality can not be known. But once Reality is known then it becomes obvious (as this Metaphysics explains) how lack of True Knowledge led to errors and mistakes, and as Hume remarks;
It is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtle reasonings; and one mistake is the necessary parent of another, while he pushes on his consequences, and is not deterred from embracing any conclusion, by its unusual appearance, or its contradiction to popular opinion. (Hume, 1737)
Some of these errors (e.g. the belief in the separate existence of Time and 'Particles', which are both actually caused by the Wave Structure of Matter) have existed in Philosophy and Physics for thousands of years and have resulted in strange paradoxes (e.g. Particle/wave duality) that cause such confusion and conflict both for the Philosopher and Human Society at large. Fortunately Truth has a particular power to solve these problems and thus to survive and slowly spread within our human society and culture, as Schopenhauer wryly observes;
Although as a rule the absurd culminates, and it seems impossible for the voice of the individual ever to penetrate through the chorus of foolers and fooled, still there is left to the genuine works of all times a quite peculiar, silent, slow, and powerful influence; and as if by a miracle, we see them rise at last out of the turmoil like a balloon that floats up out of the thick atmosphere of this globe into purer regions. Having once arrived there, it remains at rest, and no one can any longer draw it down again. (Schopenhauer, 1819)
'The Gift of Truth Excels all Other Gifts.' (Buddha)
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